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ABSTRACT 
With the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, hybrid war became a buzzword 
within political and academic circles. This thesis examines hybrid warfare applications 
using contemporary and historical examples. The analysis seeks to determine why a 
country was or was not successful in its execution of hybrid war, and it assesses the geo-
political context of cost, benefit, and risk for an aggressor state contributing to its 
decision to engage in hybrid warfare. The case studies selected include the 1923 German 
Communist Revolution, Germany’s 1938 annexation of Austria, the 2008 Russia-Georgia 
War, and the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. In each case study, a state went on the 
offensive, deliberately choosing hybrid tactics to obtain an objective. 
Ultimately, the thesis objective strives to deepen our understanding of hybrid war, 
and to extrapolate how one seemingly minor hybrid event can be tied into a broader goal 
of an aggressor state in its interactions with a defender state. The analysis of the case 
studies suggests that the length of the conflict, local support, consolidated leadership, and 
the power balance between the two states involved have contributed to the success of 
state-sponsored hybrid war.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
In January 2013, Chief of the Russian Army General Staff General Valery 
Gerasimov spoke at an annual session of the Academy of Military Sciences about the 
importance of “non-direct and asymmetrical operations,” which would be vital for Russia 
to incorporate to ensure future success.1 He stated that “the role of nonmilitary means of 
achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded 
the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness.”2 Mark Galeotti argued that this 
sentence in Gerasimov’s speech meant Russia must look to non-military methods to 
achieve its strategic goals.3 The speech has been referred to as the Gerasimov Doctrine 
and was seen by many academic and government officials in Western countries as a new 
emphasis for Russian military policy.  
In the spring of 2014, in what some considered an application of the Gerasimov 
Doctrine, Russia annexed the Crimea from Ukraine. Russia continued to apply this 
doctrine when it, through various means, destabilized the Ukrainian provinces of Donetsk 
and Lugansk. In December 2014, the U.S. State Department’s International Security 
Advisory Board stated the annexation of Crimea was “the first time one nation has seized 
and annexed territory from another in Europe since the end of World War II.”4 These 
events have unnerved the many nations that make up the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). 
Non-linear or hybrid war can be described as a combination of economic, social, 
cyber, military, media, and political means that are used to achieve a particular goal. 
Waging war using these methods is not new. Indeed, Williamson Murray noted that “the 
                                                 
1 Mark Galeotti, “The ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ and Russian Non-Linear War,” In Moscow’s Shadows, 




4 International Security Advisory Board, Report on US-Russia Relations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs, 2014), http://www.state.gov/t/avc/isab/234902.htm. 
2 
historical record suggests that hybrid warfare in one form or another may well be the 
norm for human conflict rather than the exception.”5  
This thesis will examine Russia’s current conflict with Ukraine, and compare and 
contrast its hybrid applications with contemporary and historical examples. Three of the 
case studies, two contemporary and one historical, are Russian and Soviet examples of 
hybrid war. To provide additional perspective and by way of comparison, the second 
historical case study is from Nazi Germany. These specific countries were selected 
because they provide examples in which the state went on the offensive deliberately 
using hybrid tactics to obtain an objective. Sometimes the state was successful, and 
sometimes it was not.  
This thesis analyzes why a country was or was not successful in its execution of 
hybrid war, and assess the geo-political context of cost, benefit, and risk for an aggressor 
state contributing to its decision to engage in hybrid warfare. Ultimately, the thesis 
objective is to deepen our understanding of hybrid war, and to extrapolate how one 
seemingly minor hybrid event can be tied into a broader goal of an aggressor state in its 
interactions with a defender state. Russia is of particular interest due to its recent hybrid 
tactics in Ukraine. 
B.     SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
A state that wages war using hybrid or non-linear tactics does not solely use 
conventional military means to accomplish its goal. Christian Nunlist and Martin Zapfre 
describe hybrid war in the European context as “a long-known, politicized form of 
warfare below the threshold of full-blown conventional war that combines subversion 
and low-key political violence with external military pressure.”6 In a world with varying 
degrees of conventional military power, it is logical to assume that if a state can achieve 
5 Williamson Murray, “Conclusion,” in Hybrid Warfare : Fighting Complex Opponents from the 
Ancient World to the Present, ed. Williamson Murray and Peter R. Mansoor (Cambridge University Press, 
2012), 290.  
6 Christian Nünlist and Martin Zapfe, “NATO after Wales: Dealing with Russia-Next Steps,” ETH-
Center for Security Studies, CSS Analyses in Security Policy, no. 161 (2014), 
http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/184352/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/32ab5e58-
4889-4940-9012-b487cfa437c5/en/CSSAnalyse161-EN.pdf. 
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its objective without crossing the threshold of conventional war, it will do so. Russia has 
successfully used a hybrid combination of military, economic, political, and social tactics 
in Eastern Europe, which has created a frozen conflict in Ukraine. Despite severe 
condemnation, sanctions, and threats from the greater economic and military might of 
NATO and the EU, Russia has not stopped in Ukraine. Hybrid war is not a new concept, 
but it is currently attracting attention because its application in the Russian-Ukrainian 
conflict was so successful. States around the world are analyzing this situation to 
determine why it was successful and whether or not they will be able to have similar 
results if they use the same methods. To understand the current situation fully, states 
should examine how and why hybrid war has and has not succeeded in the past century.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Before one can examine historical examples of hybrid war, one must first 
understand what is meant by “hybrid war,” or what makes a war “hybrid.” There are 
many definitions and labels. Hybrid war has been called irregular war, asymmetric war, 
unconventional war, limited war, and ambiguous war. It is helpful to list a few definitions 
here to provide perspective.  
Ambiguous warfare “applies in situation in which a state or non-state belligerent 
actor deploys troops and proxies in a deceptive and confusing manner—with the intent of 
achieving political and military effects while obscuring the belligerent’s direct 
participation.”7 
Irregular Warfare is “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for 
legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s).” 8 
Unconventional Warfare is an “activity conducted to enable a resistance 
movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying 
                                                 
7 Mary Ellen Connell and Ryan Evans, “Russia’s ‘Ambiguous Warfare’ and Implications for the U.S. 
Marine Corps,” CNA Occasional Paper, Strategic Studies (CNA Analysis and Solutions, May 2015), 1, 
https://www.cna.org/research/2015/russias-ambiguous-warfare. 
8 “Joint Publication 1-02 - Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,” 
March 15, 2015, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf. 
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power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a 
denied area.”9 
Asymmetric Warfare is “warfare that is between opposing forces which differ 
greatly in military power and that typically involves the use of unconventional weapons 
and tactics.”10 
Limited War requires “belligerents choose not to fight at full capacity, in order 
that a conflict neither gains in intensity nor expands in space and time.”11 Limited war 
could be waged with and without hybrid tactics. 
What then separates hybrid war from the definitions listed above? War becomes 
“hybrid” when hybrid tactics are used by the aggressor. A hybrid threat is defined as 
“any adversary that simultaneously employs a tailored mix of conventional weapons, 
irregular tactics, terrorism and criminal behavior in the same time and battlespace to 
obtain their political objectives.”12 As with asymmetric warfare, a central idea of hybrid 
tactics is using all means available to obtain an objective, usually (but not always) 
because the aggressor does not have a strong enough conventional military obtain the 
objective by itself. The application of hybrid tactics can be used by both state and non-
state actors. How these definitions are used often depends on the context of the situation 
they are attempting to describe. Often the “hybrid” application refers to a threat or the 
adversary who is employing specific means to achieve a goal.  
One of the most basic definitions of hybrid war is the “blend of the lethality of 
state conflict with the fanatical and protracted fervor of irregular war.”13 This definition 
was further expanded by saying that hybrid wars are “sophisticated campaigns that 
                                                 
9 Ibid.  
10 “Asymmetric Warfare,” Merriam-Webster Dictionary, accessed June 2, 2015, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/asymmetric warfare. 
11 Lawrence Freedman, “Ukraine and the Art of Limited War,” Survival 56, no. 6 (November 2, 
2014): 8, doi:10.1080/00396338.2014.985432.  
12 Frank Hoffman, “On Not-So-New Warfare: Political Warfare vs Hybrid Threats,” War on the 
Rocks, July 28, 2014, http://warontherocks.com/2014/07/on-not-so-new-warfare-political-warfare-vs-
hybrid-threats/.  
13 Frank G. Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars (Arlington, VA: Potomac 
Institute for Policy Studies, 2007), 38. 
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combine low-level conventional and special operations; offensive cyber and space 
actions; and psychological operations that use social and traditional media to influence 
popular perception and international opinion.”14 
Lawrence Freedman defines hybrid war as "an approach that draws upon a 
number of types of force from across the full spectrum, including terrorism, insurgency, 
and regular combat, along with the extensive use of information operations.”15 
Peter Mansoor defines hybrid war “as conflict involving a combination of 
conventional military forces and irregulars (guerrillas, insurgents, and terrorists), which 
could include both state and non-state actors, aimed at achieving a common political 
purpose.” He further notes “Irregular forces need not be centrally directed, although in 
many cases they form part of a coherent strategy used to oppose an invader or occupation 
force.”16  
Put more simply, hybrid war “is a doctrine utilizing all the instruments of power 
to compensate for military weakness by developing alternatives to and surrogates for 
military power to corrode…societies.”17 How these instruments of power are used 
depends on the resources of the state or non-state actor, and the environment they are 
engaging in.  
D. CRITIQUES OF TERM HYBRID WAR 
The fact that the aforementioned definitions may resemble each other could lead 
one to conclude that only semantics differentiate them. However, there has been a 
considerable amount of literature about why the term “hybrid” is a misnomer. Matthew 
Rojansky and Michael Kofman noted, “ ‘Hybrid’ simply denotes a combination of 
previously defined types of warfare, whether conventional, irregular, political, or 
                                                 
14 “Chapter One: Directed Energy Weapons: Finally Coming of Age?,” The Military Balance, 4, 115 
(January 2015): 9–20, doi:10.1080/04597222.2015.996336. 
15 Freedman, “Ukraine and the Art of Limited War,” 11.  
16 Peter R. Mansoor, “Introduction: Hybrid Warfare in History,” in Hybrid Warfare : Fighting 
Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present, ed. Williamson Murray and Peter R. Mansoor 
(Cambridge University Press, 2012), 2–3.  
17 Stephen Blank, “Russia, Hybrid War and the Evolution of Europe,” Second Line of Defense, 
February 14, 2015, http://www.sldinfo.com/russia-hybrid-war-and-the-evolution-of-europe/. 
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information.”18 Another argument states the term hybrid is “repacking…older concepts 
that described an enemy or scenarios that switch the ways of fighting, including 
compound war, three block war, or fourth generation warfare.”19 
Dan Cox argues that hybrid warfare is a “vague, inconsistent, catch-all” definition 
that describes all possible ranges of threats that might come against America.20 He 
further contends “hybrid” is only helpful when describing tactics, not when trying to 
explain the overall strategy an aggressor is trying to pursue. More specifically, “[hybrid 
threats] are not a useful construct to guide policy and strategy makers.”21 
Nadia Schadlow noted the frustration of many Eastern European leaders with the 
concept of hybrid war. These leaders feel the West is using the hype about hybrid war to 
avoid any decisive action against Russia because NATO has yet to fully develop a way to 
properly address hybrid threats. She states: “Inadvertently, the flexibility of the 
instruments inherent in hybrid warfare tempts policy makers to detach the specific tactics 
from the overarching political goals that drive a war.” Thus, policy makers are crippled 
with indecision and the hybrid aggressor continues to have the advantage. She concludes 
that the term “‘hybrid’ refers to the means, not to the principles, goals, or nature of 
war.”22  
Still others maintain that it is exceedingly difficult to determine precisely when a 
conflict becomes a hybrid one. These critics make a valid point. If hybrid war is a 
combination of economic, social, cyber, military, media, and political means, which are 
                                                 
18 Matthew Rojansky and Michael Kofman, “A Closer Look at Russia’s ‘Hybrid War,’” Kennan Cable 
(Wilson Center Kennan Institute, April 2015), 2, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/kennan-cable-
no7-closer-look-russia%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%9Chybrid-war%E2%80%9D.  
19 Dan G. Cox, Thomas Bruscino, and Alex Ryan, “Why Hybrid Warfare Is Tactics Not Strategy: A 
Rejoinder to ‘Future Threats and Strategic Thinking,’” Infinity Journal 2, no. 2 (Spring 2012): 25. 
20 Dan G. Cox, “What If the Hybrid Warfare/Threat Concept Was Simply Meant to Make Us Think?,” 
E-International Relations, February 13, 2013, http://www.e-ir.info/2013/02/13/what-if-the-hybrid-
warfarethreat-concept-was-simply-meant-to-make-us-think/.  
21 Cox, Bruscino, and Ryan, “Why Hybrid Warfare Is Tactics Not Strategy: A Rejoinder to ‘Future 
Threats and Strategic Thinking,’” 25. 
22 Nadia Schadlow, “The Problem with Hybrid Warfare,” War on the Rocks, April 2, 2015, 
http://warontherocks.com/2015/04/the-problem-with-hybrid-warfare/. 
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used to achieve a particular goal, must they all be used for the conflict to become 
“hybrid?” What if only two of the six conditions are met?  
Ruslan Pukhov used this argument to critique using hybrid war to describe 
Russia’s actions in Ukraine. He noted there was not any evidence that Russia used cyber 
or information operations in Crimea. Indeed, the condition of Ukraine’s armed forces was 
so inadequate, cyber operations were not needed. Information operations were not needed 
because so many of the native Crimeans believed that Crimea belonged to Russia.23 
Therefore, Russia was not using a “new” form of warfare to achieve its objectives in 
Ukraine. Pukhov also emphasized the importance of forces friendly to the aggressor state 
in the conflict zone: “In applying the term hybrid war to the conflict in Ukraine, modern 
observers use politically biased wording to overstate the importance of external factors in 
the conflict and to downplay the significance of internal factors.”  
E. OTHER ASPECTS TO BE CONSIDERED 
In addition to definitions and criticisms of hybrid war, the subject literature 
provided additional factors to be examined which help determine whether or not a 
country’s success in waging hybrid war. An important point about length of hybrid war 
was made by Peter Mansoor: “Throughout history, hybrid adversaries have been willing 
and able to extend wars in time and space to achieve their goals over the long run. Unless 
great powers possess a deep commitment, time is on the side of their hybrid opponents. 
Hybrid adversaries test the strategic patience of their opponents.”24 Who is able longer 
endure, whether it be the aggressor or the defender, matters a great deal in hybrid war. 
History has provided examples of both situations. Britain was able to win against the 
Boers in part because they had the resources, which enabled them to endure in the 
conflict, hence they could win. However, the Vietnamese were able to endure longer than 
the American public was willing to continue the war. How both of the domestic 
                                                 
23 Ruslan Pukhov, “Nothing ‘Hybrid’ About Russia’s War in Ukraine | Opinion,” The Moscow Times, 
May 27, 2015, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/nothing-hybrid-about-russias-war-in-
ukraine/522471.html.  
24 Mansoor, “Introduction: Hybrid Warfare in History,” 7. 
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populations feel about the war from both the aggressor and defender nations matters a 
great deal in hybrid conflicts.  
John McCuen expands this thought and tries to better explain the environment of 
where the conflict is taking place. Instead of saying the hybrid war is just one country 
against another He argues that battle is fought between three different populations: the 
conflict zone population, the home front population, and the international community 
population.25 McCuen’s views are important if one wants to examine a conflict from all 
perspectives.  
Freedman noted one of the problems with waging hybrid war is assuming that all 
parts of an aggressor state are unified in its hybrid goals. That is not always the case. He 
states: “Definitions which assume unified political control overlook the most challenging 
aspect of trying to bring together irregular forces, representing one set of political 
interests, and regular forces, representing another.” 26 Russia has run into this problem 
with the separatist it is backing in Donetsk and Lugansk. What Russia wants and what the 
separatists want was not always the same. 
The literature provided several historical examples of hybrid war to include the 
French-Indian War, the Spanish-French Peninsular War of 1807–1814, the Franco-
Prussian War of 1870–1871, the American-Vietnamese War, and the 2006 Israeli-
Lebanon War. Despite these examples, there has been very little written in which the 
state was the main aggressor in hybrid war. This thesis aims to correct this oversight.  
F. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Success in hybrid war, as in any type of war, depends on a variety of factors. An 
initial review of the research material suggests that state-waged hybrid war is successful 
if the offensive state is able to secure the support of the people in the area where war is 
being waged. One of the main reasons that the Communists did not succeed in Germany 
in 1923 was because most Germans were not willing to support the endeavor. The 
                                                 
25 John J. McCuen, “Hybrid Wars,” Military Review 88, no. 2 (2008): 107. 
26 Freedman, “Ukraine and the Art of Limited War,” 8. 
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situation was quite different in Austria in 1938, where the Austrian Nazi Party succeeded 
in gaining support of the Austrian people. When the German Army actually entered 
Austria in 1938, it was greeted by cheering Austrians. The importance of the indigenous 
population of the area in conflict was mentioned in the literature review.   
As with any war, actions produce unintended consequences. This is compounded 
by the multifaceted nature of hybrid war. The sanctions placed on the Russia by America 
and the EU have forced Russia to look for better economic cooperation with China 
because it is not getting the same cooperation from Europe it had before the conflict 
started. Though it is impossible to plan for all contingences, states who desire to wage 
hybrid war need to take into account not only the response of the indigenous people, but 
also of the international community as a whole.  
Another important factor mentioned in the literature review is the “strategic 
patience” an aggressor state needs to succeed in hybrid conflict.27 This becomes 
important because if a state does not have the resources to endure, it will not succeed. 
Mansoor noted that “a foreign power rarely can generate the military forces, financial 
wherewithal, and political commitment required to prosecute a hybrid war to an 
acceptable conclusion”28 Another hypothesis is that success only goes to the state with 
the most resources and time, and what hybrid methods the state uses are not germane.  
Does success rely on the individual circumstances of the conflict as opposed to 
the actual methods used? One author notes “it is important to understand the combination 
of tools in Moscow’s tool box, but the chances that it could simply repeat a Crimea or a 
Donbas scenario elsewhere are, fortunately, low. Instead, Russia’s intervention in 
Ukraine should be understood in more flexible and basic terms—as an attempt to employ 
diplomatic, economic, military, and information instruments in a neighboring state where 
it perceives vital national interests to be at stake."29 Other authors have noted that Russia 
                                                 
27 Mansoor, “Introduction: Hybrid Warfare in History,” 7. 
28 Ibid., 10. 
29 Rojansky and Kofman, “A Closer Look at Russia’s ‘Hybrid War,’” 7.  
10 
would likely not be successful it is used the same type of hybrid tactics in other parts of 
Eastern Europe.30  
A final hypothesis on why a state might choose to wage hybrid war is mentioned 
by Nicu Popescu: “One reason why hybrid war is so dangerous and potentially 
destabilising is that it is easy and cheap to launch for external aggressors, but costly in 
various ways for the defenders.”31 This is especially true when the aggressor state is 
stronger economically and military than the defender state. However, if aggressor and 
defender states have similar power levels, hybrid war is still a good choice because it 
favors the aggressor over the defender.  
G.    RESEARCH DESIGN 
To determine how hybrid war has succeeded in the past century, this thesis will 
look at four case studies. The two historical studies will be the Communist International's 
attempt to start a revolution in Germany in 1923; and German annexation (or Anschluss) 
of Austria in 1938. The two contemporary case studies will be the Russian-Georgian War 
of 2008 and the current Russian-Ukrainian conflict. The focus of this thesis will be on 
Eastern Europe with an eye to understanding contemporary Russian foreign policy. The 
objective is to deepen the world’s understanding of how Russia has used hybrid warfare 
in Ukraine and Crimea by examining the similarities and differences between the 
different case studies.  
These particular case studies were selected because in each situation, a nation-
state was the primary aggressor and it used hybrid techniques in its attempts to achieve its 
objectives.  
The source material for this thesis will be mainly secondary sources, consisting of 
books and articles, which describe the different cases.  
30 Nicu Popescu, “Hybrid Tactics: Neither New nor Only Russian,” Alert Issue, European Union 
Institute for Security Studies, 4 (30 Jan 15), doi:10.2815/378749; Blank, “Russia, Hybrid War and the 
Evolution of Europe.”   
31 Popescu, “Hybrid Tactics,” 30 Jan 15. 
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H. THESIS OVERVIEW AND DRAFT CHAPTER OUTLINE  
This thesis will be organized into six parts. The first chapter will introduce hybrid 
war and briefly describe the history and some of the criticisms of the term. The second 
chapter will focus on the USSR’s 1923 attempt to use the Communist International to 
start a communist revolution in Germany. The third chapter will examine Nazi 
Germany’s annexation of Austria in 1938. The fourth chapter will discuss the Russia-
Georgian War of 2008. The fifth chapter will explore Russia’s annexation of the Crimea 
in 2014 as well as examine the current Russian-Ukrainian conflict involving the Donetsk 
and Lugansk oblasts.32 The concluding chapter will analyze the similarities and 
differences between the four case studies to determine whether a state will be successful 
in a conflict using hybrid methods, or whether success relies on the individual 
circumstances of the conflict as opposed to the actual methods used. Analyzing these case 
studies will also aid in understanding Russia’s contemporary foreign policy.  
 
                                                 
32 Russian word meaning state or province.  
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II. THE 1923 COMMUNIST REVOLUTION IN GERMANY
Tough, like ivy creepers 
Our thoughts are twisting 
Around the goal! 
Many 
Have run ashore on the way  
to it, 
Landed 
Have in spirit already the  
prophets, 
They have seen the proletarians 
Depending on their own  
strength 
As Lords of the World. 
Pioneers, what you envisioned, 
For the freeing of the slaves, 
The deed, 
Fighters for justice, 
It approaches!  
—Mally Resso, 
published in the communist newspaper Rote Fahne, 
August 16, 1923 
In October 1923, with help from the Soviet Union, the German Communist Party 
(hereafter KPD) attempted to start a revolution in Germany using hybrid tactics. The 
revolution failed. This chapter will examine the Soviet Union’s use of hybrid tactics 
leading up to Germany’s October Revolution of 1923. The revolution was ultimately not 
successful due to poor planning, lack of Soviet understanding of the situation on the 
ground in Germany, and lack of German support for the KPD. This study will be 
conducted by first describing the historical background of what was going on in Germany 
and the Soviet Union in the years leading to the October Revolution of 1923; second, by 
exploring why this conflict failed and what lessons can be learned about hybrid war from 
this failure; and finally, by explaining why this case study helps one to understand the 
broader geo-political context of state-sponsored hybrid war. More specifically, the 
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lessons the Soviets (and later Russians) learned from this failed revolution attempt are 
relevant to Russian actions in Ukraine today.  
A. GERMAN AND SOVIET POLITICAL BACKGROUND 
The first section of this chapter will describe the historical background of what 
was going on in Germany and the Soviet Union in the years leading to the October 
Revolution of 1923. After exploring the political context of Germany and the Soviet 
Union, the immediate buildup of events before and during October Revolution will be 
outlined. This section will pay particular attention to the hybrid examples of propaganda, 
local support provided by the KPD, and the Soviet military help given to prepare for the 
revolution. It will also outline the Soviet dual policy of starting revolution while trying to 
maintain normal diplomatic and economic relationships. The Rapallo Agreement is an 
excellent example of this policy, and would have major repercussions on how the 
October Revolution would play out.  
The end of World War I left Germany in a weakened, unstable state. A revolution 
started in 1918 and ended in 1919, changing the German government from an empire to a 
republic. Though many thought peace and stability would follow the change of 
government, the Weimar Republic’s troubles were only beginning. A frequent instigator 
of those troubles was the KPD.  
The KPD was organized following the end of World War I. The KPD was 
plagued by frequent fighting between party factions. Early party leaders, such as Rosa 
Luxemburg, recommended a policy against putschism (starting a revolution) and warned 
against the dangers of outside (Russian) influence. 33 Members of the KPD were fervent 
in their zeal for revolution in Germany, but whenever revolution was actually attempted, 
the effort failed.  
Communist propaganda, usually distributed in newspapers, was the main way 
communist leaders communicated with their party members. Russian communists 
frequently wrote many of the articles circulated in these publications. Usually, the focus 
33 Werner T. Angress, Stillborn Revolution: The Communist Bid for Power in Germany, 1921-1923, 
1st ed (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963), 102. 
  15 
of the propaganda was on the mass of non-communist workers, in hope that the 
publications would motivate those workers to join the party.34 It was not uncommon for 
these newspapers to be critical of the German government, talk about strikes, and even 
promote revolution. 
After the formal organization of the KPD, underground communist groups 
frequently formed but did not coordinate their efforts with a central German communist 
authority. Werner Angress stated, “Local communist underground organizations 
frequently acted on their own initiative and, as was inevitable, incidents occurred which 
arouse the suspicion of the German authorities that the KPD was secretly but actively 
preparing for revolution.”35 The German government had good reason to be suspicious.  
The police discovered in several local party offices blueprints for a red army and 
other documents pertaining to Communist military plans during the proletarian uprising 
in the Ruhr region in March and April, 1920.36 At the beginning of February 1921, 
documents that suggested the Soviet Embassy was involved in smuggling arms and 
explosives were copied from the Soviet mission in Berlin, furthering communist 
propaganda, and financing underground communist activities in Germany. Later in the 
month, dynamite, arms and other military equipment were found.37 It is not known 
whether this equipment came from the Soviet Union. The perception was that it did, 
which was enough to hurt the KPD’s image in the eyes of the German population.  
In 1921, unrest flared up across Germany causing many workers to strike. The 
KPD attempted to take advantage of this unrest, and use the workers’ legitimate concerns 
to start a revolution. However, the KPD’s efforts were not focused and poorly planned. 
The revolution was forcibly put down, and left many Germans with a negative view of 
the German communists.  
                                                 
34 Ibid., 410. 
35 Ibid., 107. 
36 Ibid., 106. 
37 Ibid., 108. 
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This political unrest continued into 1922. An assassination attempt was made on 
German Chancellor Philipp Scheidemann, but succeeded in only wounding him. A few 
weeks later, the German Jewish Foreign Minister, Walther Rathenau, was killed on his 
way to work. Political and social unrest continued to plague the Weimar Republic  
At the beginning of 1923, the situation became exacerbated. On January 11 of that 
year, French and Belgian forces occupied the heavily industrialized Ruhr region of 
Germany. This was done because Germany was late in making reparation payments from 
World War I. The occupation was very unpopular, and helped unite Germans in a way 
not seen since the beginning of 1914.38 The Germans, under direction of their 
government, adopted a policy of passive resistance, and refused to work; workers were 
actually being paid by the German government to stay home. This infuriated the French 
occupiers, but Germany’s actions were not without cost. The payment of German 
workers combined with the printing of money to purposely inflate German currency 
(making reparation payments worthless) caused severe hyperinflation.39  The situation 
worsened when “wages became worthless, unemployment rates went up, and those in 
employment were in precarious part-time positions.” In early August, a wave of strikes 
brought down the German government led by Wilhelm Cuno,”40 and Gustav Stresemann 
assumed the chancellorship.   
Communist propaganda became much more aggressive after the Cuno strikes in 
August 1923, hinting of a future revolution and that the proletariat must arm 
themselves.41 On August 22, 1923, an appeal was made in the main communist 
newspaper, the Rote Fahne (Red Flag): “Join the KPD, that is the demand of the hour! 
Long live the proletarian class struggle! … the dictatorship of the proletariat! … the 
                                                 
38 Ibid., 281. 
39 Zachary Shore, A Sense of the Enemy: The High Stakes History of Reading Your Rival’s Mind, 1st 
ed. (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014), 32. 
40 Gleb J. Albert, “‘German October Is Approaching’: Internationalism, Activists, and the Soviet State 
in 1923,” Revolutionary Russia 24, no. 2 (December 1, 2011): 112–113, 
doi:10.1080/09546545.2011.620360. 
41 Angress, Stillborn Revolution, 408. 
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Communist International!”42 These publications flagrantly promoted the Comintern.  
One article written by Karl Radek warned the international community against interfering 
in German internal affairs, stating the Soviet Union would not look upon such meddling 
kindly.43 That warning was ironic, as it was exactly what the Soviet Union was doing in 
Germany.   
The Stresemann government noted this repeated rhetoric and took steps to stop it 
from spreading. The Rote Fahne’s offices in Berlin were raided by the police and shut 
down for a period of time. This did not deter the communists, and they continued their 
calls for revolution.44 The German government responded by limiting the communists’ 
ability to gather and by shutting down the newspapers, hindering their ability to 
communicate with each other. Despite this suppression, the KPD and the Soviets knew 
“the political costs of extreme economic dysfunction left the country primed for 
revolution,”45 and attempted to take advantage of the situation. 
The Soviets, like the Germans, were in a persistent state of upheaval at the end of 
World War I. The Soviet Revolution in 1917 actually caused the Russians to leave World 
War I before any other major world power. The Russian Civil War, which followed the 
revolution, lasted until 1921. Despite the ongoing civil war, the Soviets set about securing 
their power and organizing their government. A key international mission of the new 
state was to spread the revolution to other countries. Lenin was “convinced that it was 
essential to secure the victory of the Russian revolution by carrying it abroad to western 
Europe and especially Germany—a defeated, impoverished country, bitterly hostile to the 
Western victors, and with a large and politically conscious proletariat.”46 The Soviet 
leaders decided a new institution needed to be created, whose purpose was to gather 
                                                 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid., 412. 
44 Ibid., 409. 
45 Shore, A Sense of the Enemy, 32. 
46 Angress, Stillborn Revolution, 60. 
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communists from other countries and, when possible, spread the revolution to those 
locations.47 Though idealistic, it was an important goal of the Soviet Union.  
On January 24, 1919, an invitation was sent to 39 revolutionary working-class 
movements from all over the world to attend the Founding Congress of the Third 
(Communist) International, or Comintern.48 The purpose of the congress was to help 
spread communism around the world. The KPD attended the congress and became the 
first communist party outside of Russia to join the Comintern. Though other foreign 
communist parties also joined the Comintern, in reality, “the Comintern was destined 
from birth to serve first and foremost the Russian State.”49 By joining the Comintern, the 
KPD made itself vulnerable to Russian influence.  
Even while fighting a civil war, the Soviet Union started sending people to 
Germany as early as December, 1918 in order help push revolution further to the left.50 
Despite its ambition, it was not until the summer of 1921 that the Soviet Union, after 
overcoming revolution and civil war, was in a position to exert more influence over the 
communist parties of Europe.51 Though the Soviet Union wanted to spread communism 
throughout the world, it also realized it could not continue to exist without the support of 
other countries. This led to the creation of a unique, dual-purposed foreign policy. 
Through the Comintern, the Soviet Union attempted to “coordinate and assist the efforts 
of national communist parties in their revolutionary opposition to the metropolitan and 
colonial governments of the imperialist powers.”52 Through the Foreign Ministry, the 
Soviet Union pursued normal diplomatic and economic relations with other countries. 
                                                 
47 Martin Malia, The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991 (New York, NY: 
Free Press, 1995), 276. 
48 Angress, Stillborn Revolution, 48. 
49 Ibid., 50. 
50 Ibid., 55. 
51 Ibid., 194. 
52 Jon Jacobson, When the Soviet Union Entered World Politics (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1994), 44. 
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Idealistically created, in practice, the dual policy hurt more than helped the Soviet 
Union.53 
This dual policy created tension within the Soviet leadership. Both policies had 
different objectives, which did not seem to coincide. On one hand, the Comintern was 
committed to spreading communism throughout the world. During this timeframe, the 
most promising place where this might succeed was Germany. On the other hand, the 
Soviet Union needed to start interacting with other countries in order to achieve 
international recognition.54 Which policy was most important? That answer depended on 
who one spoke with, but until a priority decision was made, the Soviets would pursue 
both policies.   
An example of the problems that came from the dual policy was the Rapallo 
Agreement between the Soviet Union and Germany. The Rapallo Agreement, signed in 
April 1922, was the first time the Soviet Union entered into a diplomatic relationship 
with another country. The agreement established “trade and clandestine military 
cooperation between the two ‘out’ powers of Europe.”55 This treaty was important to the 
Soviet Union, and was considered a major win for the Soviet Foreign Ministry.  
Though the treaty was good for the Soviet economy and military, it actually 
complicated the communist policy in Germany. As Angress stated, “How could the KPD 
continue to preach revolution against a state which had just formally committed itself to 
improving its relations with the fatherland of the proletariat?”56 The Soviets ignored this 
paradox and continued to pursue both revolution and a peace policy despite their obvious 
incompatibility.   
A state using hybrid tactics utilizes all resources at its disposal, and the economy 
is one of the most important hybrid resources. Interestingly enough, through the Rapallo 
agreement, the Soviets actually tried to help Germany’s economy rather than hurt it. The 
                                                 
53 Ibid., 49. 
54 Ibid., 44–45; 49. 
55 Malia, The Soviet Tragedy, 276. 
56 Angress, Stillborn Revolution, 236. 
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hyperinflation suffered in 1923 came about through deliberate German government 
action in response to the Ruhr Crisis. Though the Soviet Union did not try to make the 
situation worse in Germany through economic action, Germany’s poor economy was one 
reason why the Comintern decided to attempt a revolution in 1923.  
Germany was aware of the Soviet Union’s confusing foreign policy. The German 
government also had ample proof of Soviet interference within their country, but chose 
not to act on the evidence as economic cooperation was considered more important. The 
Rapallo Agreement is an excellent example of the dual-pronged Soviet foreign policy of 
revolution and cooperation. The Agreement’s importance to both Germany and the Soviet 
Union would have ramifications of how the October Revolution would play out.  
B. BUILD UP AND EVENTS LEADING TO THE REVOLUTION ATTEMPT 
Now that a brief background of the German and Soviet political situations has 
been examined, the buildup and events leading to the revolution attempt will be outlined. 
This section will also highlight hybrid uses of propaganda, local assistance in Germany 
provided by the KPD, and Soviet military support that was used leading up to the 
revolutionary attempt.  
Soviet leaders viewed the Cuno strikes and the new Stresemann government as a 
catalyst for a “new and decisive chapter…in the activity of the German Communist Party 
and, with it, the Comintern.”57 On August 23, 1923, the Politburo met to discuss the 
German situation. Leon Trotsky advocated that the KPD should prepare for revolution 
and believed the positive outcome (for the communists) of such a revolution would be 
seen in weeks. Grigori Zinoviev, the head of the Comintern concurred, but felt it would 
take months not weeks. Only Stalin voiced doubt about the German revolution, believing 
it would not likely happen.58 Despite the differences of opinion, the Politburo agreed on a 
number of methods to fuel the flames of revolution in Germany.  
                                                 
57 Ibid., 392. 
58 Ibid., 395. 
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The Soviets were thorough in their planning, using methods that were successful 
in their own revolution. These measures included coordinating with the KPD, forming 
“red army” detachments in Germany, organizing revolutionary cells in German trade 
unions, and sending money to the Soviet embassy in Berlin to finance the revolution.59 
The Politburo enlisted the help of the Soviet population to support the German 
revolution. Russian workers were expected to give some of their wages for the effort. 
Lists were made of German-speaking Russians who could be transferred to Germany to 
aid the revolution.60 While many of these measures were successful in Russia, it would 
prove not to be the case in Germany.  
Revolution could not succeed without weapons and military support. Both were 
provided by the Soviet Union, starting in as early as 1921. In that year, the Soviets 
smuggled arms and explosives into Germany through the Soviet embassy in Berlin.61 
After the Ruhr crisis started in January 1923, the Soviet Union sent 24 Russian “civil 
war” experts covertly to Germany. 62 These experts acted mainly as observers. Their 
presence demonstrates the Soviet Union’s early commitment to securing a communist 
Germany; they were placed before launching a communist revolution was even feasible.  
After the decision was made to start the revolution, General Peter Skoblevsky was 
appointed to oversee military operations in Germany.63 Planning consisted of training the 
proletariat, obtaining weapons, and determining which areas of Germany should be 
initially secured before marching on Berlin.64 Skoblevsky went to Germany directly to 
run the operation.  
Russian weapons were shipped to Hamburg, where they were offloaded by 
members of the KPD.65 Money was given to the Soviet embassy so weapons could be 
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65 Jacobson, When the Soviet Union Entered World Politics, 133. 
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purchased directly from Germans.66 A key part of the overall plan was to quickly 
overcome German government forces and secure their weapons to be later used by other 
communists.  
It now fell upon the Comintern to convince the KPD that it was time for 
revolution. Due to frequent failed revolution attempts (and party leadership infighting), 
the Soviet Union was able to solidify its control of the KPD. In doing so, the USSR 
suppressed any KPD independence and took steps to ensure the KPD would do what the 
Soviet Union wanted them to do.  
After German Chancellor Cuno’s government collapsed in August 1923, Heinrich 
Brandler, the chairman of the KPD, was called to Moscow at the beginning of September 
1923. Brandler was surprised by the Soviet support for the German revolution.67 At first, 
he felt that to attempt a revolution would be a gamble, with the odds against success due 
to the German population’s view of the KPD.68 Brandler spent a month in Moscow, and 
over that time was so caught up in the Soviet enthusiasm that he changed his mind. 69  
The plan was essentially thus: On the day of the uprising, a signal was to be sent 
proclaiming a general strike throughout Germany. Communist forces would overcome 
government forces, and the proletarian hundreds would wage partisan warfare to prevent 
the enemy from rallying forces.70 In the course of planning the revolution, Brandler told 
the Comintern that they could count on the active support of from 50,000-60,000 
proletarians in Saxony. Those numbers ended up being highly inflated,71 because 
Brandler had an unrealistic view of how communists were viewed in Germany, even 
though he himself was German. This delusion was transferred to the plan, which aided its 
failure due to lack of supporters and actual weapons on hand.  
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The target time for the revolution was to be sometime in November. Brandler 
returned to Germany at the beginning of October to begin further preparations. Soviet 
leadership has been accused of only seeing what it wants to see. After meeting with 
Brandler, the Comintern felt it had a good understanding of the situation in Germany. In 
reality, it did not, which contributed to the revolution’s failure.  
In the end, the October Revolution was anti-climactic. On October 21,, 1923, a 
labor conference was held in Chemnitz, Saxony. Saxony was on the whole supportive of 
the communists. Brandler spoke and bluntly called for a general strike.72 His call was 
met with “icy silence.”73 It soon became clear to Brandler and other communist leaders 
that if labor members in Saxony would not support a strike, there would be no support 
across the country. The communist leaders called off the strike and the revolution was 
over before it had even began.74  
The lack of support for a revolution did not reach the communists in Hamburg. 
They did strike, and for a few days, a battle waged. It quickly became clear that the 
majority of Hamburg residents also did not support the communists, and the police were 
able to quell the rebellion without the help of the military.   
The revolution attempt failed. The KPD ceased to be a major concern for the 
German government. Though the Comintern had failed, the Rapallo Agreement was still 
in force and the German government chose not to raise any objection over Soviet 
interference. The Soviets, in spite of their dual foreign policy and failed hybrid attempt, 
still felt they came out ahead. 
C. WHY DID THIS HYBRID CONFLICT FAIL? 
Jon Jacobson described the Soviet push for a German revolution in 1923 was “an 
exercise in wishful thinking.”75 This section will clarify why the attempt failed despite 
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using hybrid techniques. It will also cover some lessons that can be gleaned from this 
case study about application and execution of hybrid war.  
One reason why this attempt was “wishful thinking” is because the Politburo and 
Comintern did not have a realistic idea of what was going on inside Germany. German 
Communist Party leaders, due to frequent infighting, were ultimately weak and afraid to 
challenge the Comintern. So when the Comintern pushed the idea of revolution in August 
1923, the KPD acquiesced, though Brandler, at the beginning of the venture did not think 
a revolution would be supported by the German population.  
The Soviet Union attempted to instigate the German revolution through a hybrid 
combination of gaining local support, propaganda, and military means. In some ways, 
these means were effective. The Soviet Union had virtually complete control of the KPD. 
Communist propaganda was especially effective in August and September 1923, because 
it took advantage of the economic situation in Germany, and made itself more appealing 
to the common German worker. The Soviet military successfully infiltrated Germany 
with military personnel and weapons to prepare for the revolution.  
In the end, these hybrid tactics failed. The Soviet Union did control the KPD, but 
it was a broken instrument. The KPD, despite its many efforts, could not connect with the 
common German worker. The KPD’s delusional view of the German situation was 
transmitted to the Comintern and used as a basis for revolution, with predictable results.  
The German government frequently shut down communist presses because 
communist propaganda was often inflammatory, calling to arms and revolution; the KPD 
was also in league with and under the control of a foreign power. This happened at a 
critical planning juncture of the revolution and prevented the word from spreading across 
Germany. 
Though military plans were made for the revolution, the Comintern unrealistically 
expected these plans to be implemented in a short period of time. This proved 
unsuccessful, especially when it became clear that the KPD did not have the number of 
supporters that it thought it did. Had more time been taken in not only drafting the plan, 
but in preparing the communist forces in Germany, it arguably would have been more 
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effective. However, that was not the case. The German communists did not have as many 
supporters as they thought, and without this critical support, the plan was doomed to 
failure.  
D. LESSONS LEARNED ABOUT APPLICATION AND EXECUTION OF 
HYBRID WAR 
This conflict would not be considered a “war” because very little fighting took 
place and the revolution ultimately failed to start. However, this conflict can still be 
considered hybrid because of the variety of methods (including local support through the 
KPD, use of Soviet military, and prevalence of communist propaganda) used by the 
Soviet Union to try and start a communist revolution in Germany. 
The October Revolution was an unsuccessful hybrid conflict. Examining this 
failure provides some insight as to how a state can better use hybrid tactics to achieve a 
goal. It also shows the beginning of a pattern in which Soviet (and later Russian) leaders 
use all the resources they have on hand in their endeavors to succeed. How well the 
aggressor state balances its depth (how many) and breadth (flexibility, audacity, use of 
everything) of resources will determine how sustainable the hybrid effort is. And this 
sustainability factors into the success or failure of a hybrid conflict. 
1. Military 
 A lesson can be gleaned from examining how an aggressor states uses the 
military. In a hybrid conflict, the military can be used three ways. The first involves 
providing training and weapons to the indigenous population that is supporting the 
aggressor state. The second way is actually fighting in the conflict. The third way is 
providing outside pressure (like threat of invasion) to the defending state. The Soviet 
Union used the first two methods but did not use the third. This is partly because the 
Soviet Union and Germany did not share a common border, making the threat of military 
invasion unlikely (at that point in time). The Soviet Union’s military, following years of 
revolution and civil war, was also not that strong.  
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2. Propaganda  
The use of propaganda is an important aspect of hybrid conflicts. Propaganda 
allows the aggressor state the ability to put its spin on the conflict in question, both at 
home and in the country being targeted. How effective the propaganda is depends a great 
deal on how long it has been allowed to circulate and how well it is accepted by the 
people it is targeting.  
It is difficult to determine how effective communist propaganda was in Germany. 
Communist propaganda was common in Germany throughout the course of this conflict. 
It would frequently get a lot of media attention, and caused the government some 
concern, but ultimately was not a strong enough catalyst to get German citizens to 
actually do something about what they were reading.76 Overall, the political preparation 
for the October Revolution was weak. One of the main reasons was that the “chief organ 
of the party, the Rote Fahne was banned throughout most of the crucial period of 
preparation.”77 The revolution could not succeed without support from the masses, which 
could not be reached en masse without the newspaper.  This was a contributing factor to 
the revolution’s failure.  
3. Local Support 
A critical element of waging successful hybrid war is the support of at least some 
of the indigenous population. This support, if used well and combined with other 
economic, military, and propaganda pressure, can sometimes allow the aggressor state to 
succeed in attaining its objective without the use of military force. This was not the case 
in the 1923 revolution attempt. The Soviet Union could not have any hope for a 
revolution without the support of the KPD. The KPD, however, did not have the support 
of the German population. Without this support, it would not matter how much aid the 
Soviets gave the KPD, their efforts were doomed from the moment they began planning a 
revolution in September 1923.  
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4. Leadership Consensus 
Though there is little evidence to support it, the lack of complete consensus 
between Soviet and Comintern leadership on the revolution attempt also contributed to its 
failure. Complete consensus is difficult to obtain in most forms of government besides 
dictatorships. Though the German revolution was important to the Soviets, it came at a 
time of leadership flux within the Soviet Union. Spreading communism throughout the 
world was important to Lenin, but in fall, 1923, Lenin was essentially out of power. He 
died three months after the revolution failed. The leaders of the Soviet Union were 
jockeying for power in Lenin’s absence, which meant they were not solely focused on the 
German revolution. The revolution seemed at times like an afterthought; it would be nice 
if it happened, but if not, it would not be a great loss to the Soviet Union. Had the entire 
Soviet leadership been focused on German revolution, the outcome might well have been 
different.  
E. BROADER GEO-POLITICAL CONTEXT – WHY CHOOSE HYBRID 
STRATEGY? 
In addition to examining why the October Revolution failed and extrapolating 
what can be learned from this failure about hybrid war, it is important to apply the case 
study to a broader geo-political context. More specifically, why would a state choose to 
use hybrid techniques to achieve its goal?    
Before entering into a conflict, a state must look at the cost, benefits, and risks to 
starting the endeavor. The costs and risks can be political, economic, include loss of life, 
and loss of land. The benefits are usually obvious; the state gets something that it wants. 
A state will usually choose to start a conflict if the benefits outweigh the costs and steps 
are taken to mitigate the risks.  
In this case study, the Soviet Union, through the Comintern, tried to spread 
communism in Germany by backing a KPD revolution attempt. Simultaneously, the 
Soviet foreign ministry was also trying to increase the U.S.S.R.’s international reputation 
by negotiating trade and military treaties with other countries. The country targeted by 
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both policy goals was Germany. The competing policies were pursued because there was 
a lack of complete consensus amongst Soviet leadership.  
The Comintern elected to instigate a communist revolution in Germany because 
the timing seemed fortuitous. Based partly on faulty information provided by the KPD, 
and because of their own delusional views on communist uprisings, the Comintern felt it 
could support the revolution with very little cost to the Soviet Union.  
Using hybrid tactics allowed the Soviet Union the flexibility to approach the 
revolution from multiple avenues. Most of the risk was placed on the KPD. The KPD 
increased communist propaganda and was charged with organizing the German masses. 
The only support directly linked to the Soviet Union was military equipment, money, and 
advisors. Though this support was inflammatory, compared to Germany’s military and 
police strength, it was relatively small. These tactics were also chosen because they were 
covert. The Soviets knew overt revolutionary action in Germany would receive strong 
international condemnation. Covert action allowed some deniability should the 
condemnation come.  
The USSR was able to escape without punishment and with little condemnation 
for meddling in Germany’s affairs because Germany required the Soviet Union to 
increase its power. Germany needed the Soviet Union’s support more than it needed to 
scandalize the Soviet Union by publishing the failed revolution attempt to the world. 
Germany looked the other way, and the Soviet Union was able to save face in its fiasco 
attempt to change the German government. The Soviets, instead trying to pursue another 
revolution attempt, focused on strengthen its military and economic ties with Germany. 
This allowed the two countries to focus on their similar international situations and 
ignore the Soviet-instigated revolution, which just happened to take place while both 
countries were strengthening military and economic ties through the Rapallo Agreement.   
F. HOW IS THIS CASE STUDY RELEVANT TO CONTEMPORARY 
RUSSIAN ACTIONS IN UKRAINE? 
This case study is important to understanding Russia today because Russia 
frequently uses the institutional knowledge the Soviet Union gained during its reign. The 
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Russian military and intelligence agencies are still based off of their Soviet predecessors. 
The lessons learned from Soviet mistakes are lessons Russia can also learn from, so it 
(Russia) does not make the same mistakes.  
The failure of the 1923 communist revolution in Germany provided an example to 
the Soviet Union of what not to do when trying to achieve a goal (export revolution) in 
another country. The USSR failed in its efforts in Germany because its leaders 
overestimated the amount of local support they felt they would receive, and 
underestimated the amount of time it would take to successfully mount the operation.  
Despite its failure, the Soviets learned from their mistakes, and refined the 
techniques implemented during 1923 revolution. The Soviets realized they did not have 
as much support as they thought they did, and so they worked hard to establish 
intelligence networks to both gather information and influence the local population in the 
countries within and bordering the Soviet Union. A tool frequently used in this technique 
is propaganda, which was (and is) used within and without Russia to make sure that 
Russia’s views of a situation were (and are) the ones being seen. This helps the 
populations to receive the message the government wants them to hear. This was very 
prevalent during the Soviet Era and is still seen in Russia today.  
The problems associated with divided leadership and dual foreign policies are 
also worth mentioning. The timing of the revolution attempt in October, 1923 was logical 
to the Soviets because of the economic and political problems Germany was facing. The 
Soviets, however, were not united in their goals at this time because of the power vacuum 
created by Lenin’s absence. When that vacuum was eventfully filled by Stalin, the 
consensus was no longer needed. One did what Stalin wanted, or risked dying. There was 
no middle ground. Having a single leader like Stalin (or Putin) also eliminates the 
concern of conflicting foreign policies. If they are conflicting, it is because the leader 
wants them that way and the government assumingly knows what it most important to the 
leader.  
Another lesson the Soviets learned was to apply all resources available towards 
achieving a goal. This did not happen in the October Revolution. In addition to divided 
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leadership, the Soviet Union did not have many resources in 1923, and those it did have 
were not well applied to the revolution attempt. This partly because in its push to start the 
revolution as quickly as possible, the Comintern did not allow for enough time to ensure 
Soviet resources were properly in place. The lack of German support for communists 
probably would have made this point moot, but it is still worth mentioning.  
The revolution failure and lack of German response also showed the Soviets they 
could maintain some form of political legitimacy while at the same time trying to subvert 
the government of another country. It has already been discussed why this double 
standard in foreign policy is not efficient, but that does not stop Russia from continuing 
to use the standard today, and it has in both Ukraine and Georgia. 
G. CONCLUSION  
The October Revolution was ultimately not successful due to poor planning, lack 
of Soviet understanding of the situation on the ground in Germany, and lack of German 
support for the KPD. This attempt would be the last time that the Soviets tried to instigate 
an armed insurrection against any imperialist power.78 In November, 1923, Hitler 
attempted a putsch in Bavaria, which was quickly suppressed.  While in prison, Hitler 
learned something that the communists did not: he needed to work the local population to 
gain power legitimately. He took that lesson to heart, which helped him gain power in 
Germany and set himself up to achieve one of his most important goals, the Anschluss.  
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III. THE ANSCHLUSS 
The opening paragraph of Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf reads: 
It has turned out fortunate for me today that Destiny appointed Braunau on 
the Inn to be my birthplace. For that little town is situated just on the 
frontier between those two States the reunion of which seems, at least to 
us of the younger generation, a task to which we should devote our lives, 
and in the pursuit of which every possible means should be employed. 
German Austria must be restored to the great German Motherland. 
[Emphasis added]79 
Mein Kampf was published in 1925, but it would not be until 1938 that Hitler’s 
dream of Austria’s annexation was realized. This chapter will explore how Hitler 
successfully used hybrid tactics to achieve his goal. This study will be conducted by: 
first, examining the relationship and history of Germany and Austria after World War I; 
second, explain why this conflict was successful and glean some lessons about hybrid 
war; and third, elucidate why this case study aids in understanding the geo-political 
context of state-sponsored hybrid war. Germany used a hybrid combination of military, 
economic, and political tactics to gradually increase pressure on the Austrian 
government. Consolidated leadership and weak international response contributed to 
Austria’s annexation. Ultimately, the five-year length of the conflict and local Austrian 
support led to the successful Anschluss.   
A. GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN BACKGROUND 
This section will describe the historical background of what was going on in 
Austria and Germany in the years leading to the Anschluss. After exploring the 
relationship between these two countries, the immediate events leading to the Anschluss 
will be outlined.  Specific attention will be focused on Germany’s use of hybrid tactics, 
including the support of the Austrian Nazi Party, the economy, propaganda, and the 
military.  
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Hitler was not the first person to push for Anschluss, or the annexation of Austria. 
Debates in Austria and Germany for and against Anschluss had been waged since the 
beginning of the nineteenth century.80 The Austrian Republic was born from the ashes of 
the Hapsburg Empire at the end of World War I. It would not have survived had it not 
been supported by the Allied Nations who, wanting to contain Germany, specifically 
forbade any type of Anschluss. Despite the Allies’ wishes, conversations about the 
Anschluss were not uncommon in Austria and Germany during the inter-war years, and 
became more even frequent after Hitler became chancellor in Germany in 1933.81  
After Hitler became German chancellor, his primary concern was consolidating 
his power and re-arming Germany. He was less concerned about Anschluss and adopted a 
policy of Gleichschaltung. Gleichschaltung, defined as “making the same” and “bringing 
into line” was the philosophy that the Nazi Party would come to power on its own in 
Austria, and therefore the Anschluss itself would no longer be necessary.82 In other 
words, Hitler hoped to use the Austrian Nazi Party to achieve power in Austria, making 
reunification irrelevant.    
There is no question the Anschluss would have been a great deal more difficult, if 
not impossible, had Hitler not had the support of so many Austrians. Hybrid war will not 
be successful if the aggressor state does not have at least some support from the 
defending state’s population. Hitler had more than a little support, and used that 
successfully to his advantage. 
Though Austrians were having the Anschluss conversation on their own, it was 
also heavily pushed by the Austrian Nazi Party. The Austrian Nazi Party hoped to seize 
control in Austria, using the same terror tactics and methods that its fellow members had 
successfully used in Germany. These tactics, however, had the reverse effect in Austria, 
and were condemned by the Austrian government and a large portion of the population. It 
did not help that the Anschluss was not Hitler’s top priority at this point in time. Though 
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Hitler agreed with the goals of the Austrian Nazi Party, he was too busy consolidating his 
power in Germany to provide much direction. Instead, he played the various factions 
within the Austrian Party off of each other, and as long as they did not do anything overly 
dramatic, he was content to let them figure things out on their own. On several occasions, 
Hitler had to rein in Nazi violence in Austria because it was counter-productive to 
Hitler’s long-term goals.  
From 1933 until the Anschluss in 1938, Austrian Nazis did whatever they could to 
try and gain power. They used both official and illegitimate means in their efforts. These 
included rallies, secret meetings, beatings, bombings, and propaganda. The German Nazi 
party aided the Austrian Nazis by providing leadership, personnel, propaganda, and 
money. Nazi propaganda was very prevalent during this time period, though it is difficult 
to determine how effective it was.  
In April 1933, despite the country’s unease, the Austrian Nazi Party had its 
greatest election victory, and the party’s membership doubled.83 As a means of 
solidifying his power, Englehart Dollfuss, the Austrian chancellor, suspended further 
elections, causing more conflict between the party and the Austrian government.84 
Eventually, because of increased Nazi violence, Dollfuss outlawed the Austrian Nazi 
Party on June 19, 1933.85 Simultaneously to Dollfuss’ action, weapons, explosives and 
Nazi propaganda were seized by the Austria government, and by April 1934, 
approximately 50,000 Nazis had been convicted of various offenses.86 
After the Austrian Nazi Party was outlawed, it continued to spread its propaganda. 
The radio was a favorite method; Austrian Nazis actually spoke from within Germany, 
condemning the Austrian government, and calling for further acts of terror.87 When 
protests were made by the Austrian government against these broadcasts, the response 
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was that the broadcasts were made to provide information to the German people, and not 
to incite unrest in Austria.88 In addition to the radio, loudspeakers were set up along the 
German border and pointed toward Austria, spouting insults toward the Austrian 
government.  
Germany also used air power to distribute propaganda all across Austria. The 
leaflets dropped in 1933 encouraged citizens to “withdraw their bank deposits and to 
refuse to pay their taxes.”89 They were only stopped after several European powers 
complained to Germany.  
Seeing that things were not going to plan, and “before the Austrian Nazi Party 
was outlawed, Hitler realized that the German policy of nonintervention had failed. 
Instead of the direct annexation of Austria by Germany, the Austrian NSDAP was to 
carry out the Gleichschaltung (political coordination) of the country with only a 
minimum of outside guidance.”90 To aid in this endeavor, Hitler instigated a new 
Austrian policy. The first part of this policy was an economic boycott (an important 
hybrid tool)—including preventing any Germans from vacationing in Austria—was 
implemented. This hit Austria especially hard because thirty percent of Austria’s tourist 
traffic came from Germany.91 The economic squeeze was eventually accompanied by 
blocking Austrian imports that were important to the Dollfuss government. Hitler hoped 
these measures would increase domestic pressure on Dollfuss to capitulate on his policy 
against the Nazis. In the end, Hitler’s economic policy was not successful in changing the 
course of the Dollfuss regime. However, its effects were still painful to the Austrian 
government. 
The Austrian government’s actions at the end of 1933 infuriated the Austrian 
Nazis, and in 1934, a putsch, or coup d’état, was attempted. It was quickly put down, but 
was successful in killing Dollfuss. International outrage, especially from Mussolini, a 
friend of Dollfuss, followed, and Germany was blamed for the putsch. Hitler was quick to 
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condemn the putsch’s instigators, though he would secretly have been pleased had the 
putsch been successful. Kurt von Schuschnigg was chosen as the new Austrian 
chancellor.  
After the putsch failure, Hitler repeated his order to end Nazi violence in Austria. 
Instead of violence, more subtle forms of propaganda were ordered. “The emphasis,” 
wrote a diplomat in the foreign ministry, “will be placed on the strengthening of internal 
Austrian propaganda and the organization and growth of the party which should lead to a 
situation where no government can last without Nazi cooperation.”92 This “muted” 
propaganda usually came in the form of both legal newspapers and an underground 
illegal press, which were difficult to fight and almost impossible to contain.   
B. 1936 AGREEMENT 
The putsch failure also caused Hitler to change his Austrian policy. As the Nazi 
party was outlawed, it could no longer work legitimately to undermine the state. 
Therefore, “the Gleichschaltung was to be achieved by a change in the international 
situation and by pressure from outside.”93 Nazis in Austria continued to meet and work 
against the regime, but did so without having their actions being officially sanctioned by 
the Fuhrer. By 1936, Austria’s place within the international community had changed. 
Mussolini, a strong proponent of Austrian independence during the Dollfuss regime, had 
changed his view. Italy was fighting in Ethiopia and Spain, and decided to ally itself with 
Germany, partially because of the international condemnation of Italy’s involvement in 
these conflicts. Italy’s switch of allegiance caused Austria to be more isolated 
diplomatically. To reduce that isolation, the Austrian government knew it had to come to 
some type of better understanding with Germany.94 
On 11 July, 1936, an agreement was reached between the two countries. In order 
for Austria’s diplomatic and economic relations to return to normal, it had to agree to 
allow members of the Nazi party to be represented within the government. Germany also 
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agreed to end the Nazi terror tactics and promised to respect Austria’s independence.95 In 
addition to the signed treaty, there was a “gentlemen’s agreement” between the two 
countries. Article IX of this agreement called for a general amnesty for all political 
prisoners. Two weeks later, 17,045 Nazis were released from Austrian prisons and work 
camps.96 
At this juncture, one can see the influence of Germany’s hybrid use of its 
economy. When Dollfuss was in power, Germany was unsuccessful in using its economic 
superiority to try and coerce the Austrian government into doing what it wanted. Ending 
Germany’s economic policy, however, was a key point of the 1936 agreement between 
Germany and Austria (made notably after Dollfuss’ death). Though not successful by 
itself, Germany’s use of its stronger economy, combined with other hybrid tactics, was a 
determining factor of the Anschluss.  
C. BERCHTESGADEN CONFERENCE 
Despite Hitler’s promise of non-interference in Austrian internal affairs, the 
meddling continued, usually through members of the Austrian Nazi Party. A police raid 
in May 1937, on the Nazi illegal headquarters in Vienna yielded accounts of secret talks 
between Austrian party leaders and top members of Hitler’s regime. The police also 
discovered proof that both money and propaganda material were being introduced and 
spread through the Austrian Nazi underground.97 It was important to Hitler to keep 
pressure on the Austrian government, and using propaganda was a relative cheap and 
easy way to do so. 
On November 10, 1937, Hitler spoke to the senior leaders of the Germany 
military, the war minister, and the foreign minister. During this meeting, Hitler stated: 
“The path of force is the only way to solve the German problem and this path can never 
be without risk.”98 There is no question that Germany’s military power was superior to 
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Austria’s. When dealing with Austria, however, Hitler seemed to feel the threat of 
military invasion was enough. No plans actually needed to be made, because Hitler 
wanted to give the perception that the Austrians were choosing to follow the Nazi course 
of their own free will, and not under threat of military invasion. 
On January 25, 1938, another Austrian police raid discovered a “Plan of Action 
for 1938” in a prominent Austrian Nazi’s home. The plan called for wide acts of 
provocation and sabotage, in the hopes that their violence would overwhelm the police. 
When Schuschnigg called the military for support against the expected insurrection, the 
German government would rush to defend its “persecuted brethren in Austria” by 
demanding, on threat of German military invasion, the formation of a new Austrian 
government where the Nazis would finally be given significant voice at the table.99  
Though the “Plan of Action” was created by a more extreme group of Austrian 
Nazis, its discovery nevertheless frightened the Austrian government. Between this 
security threat and the diplomatic tension between the two countries, Schuschnigg 
reluctantly decided it was time to meet again with Hitler: The Berchtesgaden Conference 
was scheduled for 12 February. Shortly before the conference was to begin, 14 tons of 
propaganda printed in Germany for Austrian Nazis was seized at the Salzburg railway 
station. It was smuggled across the border as “official post of the German railways.”100 
Despite having ample reason to be confrontational with Hitler because of recent 
events, Schuschnigg and his cabinet instead prepared to compromise with Hitler on a 
number of Nazi demands. Ten points of compromise were created by the Austrian 
government in Vienna. These points were then discussed later that day between 
Schuschnigg and Arthur Seyss-Inquart, the “legitimate” front man of the Austrian Nazi 
Party. This discussion ended 24 hours before the conference was supposed to begin.101 
There is some question as to why Schuschnigg would have such a discussion with anyone 
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other than Hitler himself. The discussion took place, however, and Seyss-Inquart 
delivered the ten points to Hitler before Schuschnigg had even left Austria.  
Armed with the ten points, Hitler was able to negotiate from an even better 
position. Hitler demanded Austria meet all ten concessions. When Schuschnigg protested 
Hitler’s comments, Hitler threw open a door, asked Schuschnigg to leave, and called for 
the Wehrmacht commander. It was a bluff; Hitler told the general he “had nothing 
particular to discuss,” but Schuschnigg did not know that.102 Schuschnigg left seeing 
Hitler having a discussion with the army commander, and assumed it was about invading 
Austria. Under this pressure, Schuschnigg capitulated on all ten points.  
A major point included making Seyss-Inquart a cabinet member, and declaring 
general amnesty for all those persons who, prior to 15 February, had violated law for 
political reasons.103 In effect, Hitler did what he thought necessary to guarantee the 
Gleichschaltung would be successful. Gordon Shepherd wrote of Schuschnigg, “He had 
set out for Berchtesgaden a free Head of Government in name, but not in spirit. He 
returned to Austria with considerably less of either liberty.”104 The Berchtesgaden 
Conference confirmed to Hitler the power of a threat. After the conference ended, Hitler 
discussed with his generals how they could simulate “invasion maneuvers” along the 
Austrian border over the next 72 hours to emphasize the so-called threat.105   
D. THE SURPRISE PLEBISCITE 
Schuschnigg returned to Austria a beaten man, aware that “the German 
government had only compromised in order to consolidate its position.”106 Four days 
after the end of the conference, Hitler gave an ominous Reichstag speech. In this speech, 
Hitler spoke of “‘ten million Germans living on the borders of the Reich…who [Hitler] 
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would not allow to be deprived of the ‘right of racial self-determination.’”107 These ten 
million Germans were in Austria and Czechoslovakia, and Hitler’s implied threat was 
well understood. With pressure continuing to increase, Schuschnigg had one more card to 
play to try and hold off the German invasion. He would appeal directly to the Austrian 
people on their feelings about Anschluss.  
A surprise plebiscite would be held on March 13, 1938. The ballot’s wording, 
“Are you for a free, independent, German, Christian, authoritarian Austria?” was 
“ingeniously calculated to pressure the Nazis either to confirm the Schuschnigg regime or 
to reject it and be open to the charges that they really did not wish to work within the 
framework of the 11 Jul 36 treaty.”108 When he heard about the plebiscite, the surprised 
Hitler immediately ordered the vote should be postponed. He also inferred that there 
would be military action if Schuschnigg did not comply with his demand. 
Despite Hitler’s frequent threats, Germany did not really have an operational plan 
to invade Austria. It was not until the announcement of the Austrian plebiscite that an old 
operation plan was quickly dusted off for the military invasion of Austria. Operation Otto 
was originally written as an invasion of Austria should a Habsburg restoration be 
attempted, but it was not taken very seriously by German military strategists.109 The plan 
was not given to the army unit that was to conduct the operation until the afternoon of 
March 10. 
Hitler’s demand to stop the plebiscite was delivered to Schuschnigg from two 
different sources, and due to the implied threat, the plebiscite was cancelled. Schuschnigg 
resigned as chancellor, and the Austrian Nazi Arthur Seyss-Inquart became the new 
chancellor. While negotiations were taking place between Schuschnigg and Seyss-
Inquart, Hitler ordered the invasion of Austria. When told the plebiscite was cancelled, 
and on the advice of Goring, Hitler allowed the invasion to continue, but gave specific 
instructions that the army was to avoid force at all cost.  
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At the last minute, Hitler ordered all the military invasion units to muster their 
bands and collect their regimental colors “so the march-in at dawn should appear 
ceremonial rather than warlike.”110 Hitler wanted to create an image of respectability, 
hiding the fact it was actually an invasion. Using both the threat of military action, and 
masking the real purpose behind that action are important components of hybrid war.  
On the morning of March 12, the day before the plebiscite was going to take 
place, German troops crossed into Austria and were greeted by cheering crowds. Hitler 
crossed the border near his birthplace of Braunau on the Inn at 1640 on March 12. The 
enthusiasm that greeted Hitler after he crossed the border helped cement his decision to 
go through with the Anschluss. On March 13, Hitler announced to a group of Austrian 
Nazi leaders that, “At this moment an important law is being issued. Article 1 read 
‘Austria is a province of the German Reich.’”111 Hitler had achieved his goal and Austria 
and Germany were now one country.  
E. WHAT MADE THIS HYBRID CONFLICT SUCCESSFUL?  
Non-linear or hybrid war can be described as a combination of economic, media, 
military, social, and political means which are used to achieve a particular goal. Hitler 
used these means in his quest for the Anschluss. More specifically, Hitler used the 
Austrian Nazi Party, the German economy, Nazi propaganda, and the German military to 
achieve his goal. How these tactics were used provides some insight into hybrid war.  
Overall, Hitler was successfully able to use hybrid tactics against Austria. On 
their own, Germany’s use of the economy, military, propaganda and local support did not 
achieve Hitler’s foreign policy goal of Anschluss or Gleichschaltung. The propaganda 
was merely annoying to Austria. The German economic tactics did not seriously hurt 
Austria’s economy. There was no actual German plan for the invasion of Austria. The 
Austrian Nazi Party was heavily monitored (and sometimes outlawed) by the Austrian 
government. However, it was the combination of all these elements that really helped 
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sway the tide against the Austrian government—this, and the fact that these steps were 
taken over a five-year period.  
Another factor that benefited Germany was that it was clearly stronger than 
Austria militarily and economically. This strength allowed Germany the freedom to try 
different hybrid techniques without fearing about major reprisal from Austria. Austria 
needed Germany more than Germany needed Austria, and both countries knew it. 
Germany successful used its power leverage against Austria, knowing that Austria could 
not (and therefore would not) do much about it.  
What happened to Austria can be compared to cooking a frog. Simply throwing a 
frog into a pot of boiling water will cause the frog to immediately jump out. By putting 
the frog in cold water and gradually increasing the temperature, the frog will not know 
what is wrong until it is too late. In this example, Austria is the frog, and the Germany’s 
use of hybrid war was the increasing water temperature. By the time Austria realized it 
should have jumped out of the pot, it was too late.  
F. LESSONS LEARNED ABOUT APPLICATION AND EXECUTION OF 
HYBRID WAR 
The failed 1923 communist revolution attempt in Germany provided an excellent 
example of what not to do when using hybrid tactics. This case study provides the 
opposite. The difference in the outcomes can be explained by looking at how the 
individual hybrid tactics were employed.  
1. Local Support  
Through the Austrian Nazi Party, Nazis had penetrated all aspects of government 
and society. Nazi sympathizers in the police and government frequently provided 
information to the party, which was then shared with the German Nazis. Hitler was able 
to obtain a copy of Schuschnigg’s concession points before he even left Austria for the 
Berchtesgaden Conference.112 Hitler used this information ruthlessly to his advantage 
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with his demands on the Austrian chancellor. News of the plebiscite was also leaked to 
the party by a Nazi secretary of one of Austrian ministers.113  
Having local support provides legitimacy to the actions of the aggressor state. If 
handled properly, the aggressor state can also create an extensive intelligence network 
amongst the local population fairly easily. In this conflict, Hitler had the Austrian 
government so thoroughly penetrated that Austrian events were known in Germany often 
before they were known in Vienna. Not having local support and intelligence would have 
significantly decreased the chances of a successful Anschluss.  
2. Propaganda 
It is not easy to determine how effective propaganda is. Just because a large 
volume of propaganda is made does not mean it is consumed at the same level. Regarding 
Nazi propaganda in Austria, what is of note is that the propaganda was consistent, and 
that “it helped to maintain the morale of [Nazi] party members while sowing distrust and 
pessimism among government loyalists.”114 It was a vital component of Hitler’s hybrid 
war with Austria, and the Nazis were quite effective at disseminating their propaganda 
through various means including radio, airplane, newspapers, and leaflets. Despite the 
many promises of non-interference from Germany, Nazi propaganda was constant in 
Austria in the years leading up to the Anschluss.  
3. Economy 
In 1934, when the Austrian government outlawed the Nazi party, Hitler was quick 
to use Germany’s economic superiority to compel Austria into giving into Nazi demands. 
It was not immediately successful. It did, however, hurt Austria’s already weak economy, 
and after enduring two years of this limited economic relationship, Austria was willing to 
do whatever Germany wanted in order to remove the economic barriers between the two 
countries. Despite its initial failure, the use of the economy is an important aspect of 
hybrid war, and contributed to Germany’s victory over Austria in 1938. 
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4. Military 
Throughout the years Germany was re-arming, no plans were ever seriously 
considered to invade Austria. Though Germany could have crushed Austria’s military 
fairly easily, the threat of military action was more effective in accomplishing’s Hitler’s 
goal. The threat of military invasion was used often. It was mentioned in the “Plan of 
Action for 1938” discovered by the Austrian police. Hitler had also threatened the use of 
military force when speaking with Schuschnigg at the Berchtesgaden Conference. The 
use of military threat played a key role in Germany’s hybrid war with Austria. 
5. Leadership Consensus 
Another important factor in Germany’s successful annexation of Austria was 
Hitler himself. After Hitler came to power in 1933, he systematically removed anyone he 
thought would be a danger to his regime. In doing so, Hitler’s word became law, for both 
the German and Austrian Nazis. In most cases, what Hitler wanted, he obtained. Hitler 
made no attempt to hide his desire for an Anschluss with Austria. This wish, coupled with 
Hitler’s complete control of the government, ensured resources were allocated to secure 
Hitler’s objective. Having one person calling the shots instead of the squabbling amongst 
a committee can make a difference in a hybrid conflict.   
G. FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS  
The one hybrid element that Hitler had the least control over was the “support” 
provided by the Austrian Nazi Party. Sometimes it was very helpful, as when Hitler was 
told about Schuschnigg’s ten points before he even left Austria.  Sometimes it made 
situations worse, like the failed putsch attempt in 1934. More than once, Hitler had to 
order the Austrian Nazis to refrain from violence and work “legitimately” with the 
government.115 That Hitler had to order “peace” more than once speaks to his control of 
local support in Austria. Despite the overzealousness of some members, the Austrian 
Nazi Party was a critical hybrid element in German’s conflict with Austria.  
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The other factor that ended up being out of Hitler’s control was the timing of the 
Anschluss. Though the pressure was increasing against Austria toward a seemingly 
inevitable conclusion; no one, including Hitler, expected the Anschluss to happen when it 
did. Jurgen Gehl stated, “the annexation of March 1938 was forced upon [Hitler] by 
events… and only when he found—to his own surprise—no resistance, he let himself be 
persuaded by Goring into the annexation."116 Despite the surprise, Hitler was able to take 
full advantage of the situation because of hybrid tactics used against Austria over the 
previous five years.   
H. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE 
The lack of international response contributed to the Anschluss. Had Hitler tried 
to annex Austria when he first came to power in 1933, he would have met stiff resistance 
from Italy. When Dollfuss, a friend of Mussolini, was assassinated, Italy moved four 
army divisions to the Austrian border in case Germany tried to make any move.117 Italy’s 
attitude toward German annexation shifted over the years as it came under increased 
international scrutiny for its wars in Ethiopia and Spain. Eventually Mussolini agreed to 
look the other way on the Austria question in return for German support.  
Italy was not the only country to abandon Austria:  
The new [international] situation contrasted strikingly during the Nazi 
Putsch of 25 Jul 34. Then, threatened by a Nazi Putsch, Italy as well as 
Yugoslavia had been ready to intervene, but their intervention would have 
been directed against each other. In the spring of 1937, in face of the much 
greater danger of an Anschluss, both countries resigned themselves to the 
loss of Austria and were bound together by the common fear of a German 
advance directed beyond. Austria found itself isolated more than ever.118  
After learning what he could achieve with Austria, Hitler used the same threat 
tactics against other countries. No country wanted to confront him.  
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When the Anschluss actually happened, the international response was small. 
Hitler received some token protests, which he ignored.119 Britain, France, and the United 
States recognized the Anschluss before a Nazi plebiscite took place on 10 April.120  
The international response is an important consideration when looking at hybrid 
war. But it is difficult to determine how much of a consideration from this case study. 
Had the international response been stronger, it is possible that Hitler could not have 
succeeded with the Anschluss in 1938.  
I. BROADER GEO-POLITICAL CONTEXT—WHY CHOOSE HYBRID 
STRATEGY? 
In addition to examining why the Anschluss was successful and exploring what 
can be learned about this hybrid conflict, it is important to apply the case study to a 
broader geo-political context. More specifically, why would a state choose to use hybrid 
techniques to achieve its goal?   
At the beginning of 1938, Germany was well on the way if not already the 
strongest country in Europe. Other European countries realized this, and because of their 
war weariness, did what they could to prevent conflict from starting. Germany had 
developed the economic and military might to do what it wanted without much concern 
over international response to its actions. Also, because Hitler had consolidated power, he 
could act without fear of losing control domestically.  
The benefit to using hybrid tactics for Germany in this situation was clear: Austria 
was annexed and became a part of the Third Reich. Germany was able to accomplish this 
without shedding blood, relatively little economic cost, and receiving weak protests from 
the international community. Germany’s international situation was much different in 
1938 than it was in 1933, and the Anschluss confirmed to Hitler he could further act in 
Europe with fear of much reprisal. It was a win-win situation for Germany.  
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It could be argued that one of the costs to Germany was the length of time it took 
for the Anschluss to happen.  In reality, length of time allowed Germany to re-consolidate 
its power and be in a better position internationally to annex Austria. Hitler made no 
effort to hide the fact he wanted an Anschluss. It took almost six years for this goal to be 
achieved, which is not an insignificant amount of time. One of the reasons Germany was 
successful, however, was that it used hybrid techniques during those six years, which 
slowly increased pressure on the Austrian government. In other words, Hitler was able to 
successfully prioritize his goals, focusing on strengthening Germany economically and 
militarily instead of constantly worrying about the Anschluss. Though the timing of the 
Anschluss was a surprise, Hitler never really believed it would not eventually happen.  
No conflict is exactly the same. Germany and Austria’s relationship was unique, 
sharing a common border, language, history, and culture. Germany arguably could have 
used the same hybrid tactics against a different, smaller country with similar results, 
though it seems unlikely the results would have been quite as successful. The many 
similarities between Germany and Austria made it easier for Germany to employ hybrid 
tactics and take advantage of the weaker Austria.  
J. HOW IS THIS CASE STUDY RELEVANT TO CONTEMPORARY 
RUSSIAN ACTIONS IN UKRAINE? 
The relationship between Germany and Austria during the 1930s has many 
similarities with the current relationship between Russia and Ukraine. Germany and 
Russia were essentially controlled by one person, Hitler and Putin. This allows these 
leaders the freedom to dictate what they want without concern of internal dissension 
within their countries. Like Germany, Russia is stronger than Ukraine militarily and 
economically, which allows Russia the ability to push (or bully) Ukraine when it feels the 
need to because Ukraine needs Russia more than Russia needs Ukraine.  
Also like Germany and Austria, Russia has been able to thoroughly penetrate the 
government as well as other aspects of society in Ukraine. This provides an information 
flow to Moscow which gives Putin an upper hand when making decision regarding 
Ukraine. It also lets Putin covertly affect the Ukrainian government while maintaining a 
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strong front of deniability that he is meddling in Ukrainian affairs. Hitler did the same in 
Austria, promising non-interference while pumping more Nazi propaganda into Austria at 
the same time.  
As with the Anschluss, Russia was able to annex the Crimea successfully with 
only a token international response. Russia was condemned by most countries and 
sanctions have affected its economy. But these responses have not been enough for 
Russia to stop meddling in Eastern Ukraine or return the Crimea. Austria only received 
its independence after a costly and lengthy war, something the West does not seem 
willing to start over the Crimea annexation. Indeed, most countries agree that Ukraine 
will never get Crimea back.  
One of the main differences between Germany and Russia was in their position 
within the international balance of power before the annexation of Austria and Crimea. 
Germany in 1938 was on the cusp of being the strongest country in Europe, and used that 
strength to conquer most of the continent. Russia, on the other hand, has been trying to 
regain the prestige it enjoyed during the Soviet regime. Russia is the most dominant 
power in Eastern Europe, but not within Europe as the whole. NATO and EU are stronger 
militarily and economically than Russia, and Russia knows this.  
Germany and Russia were successful in their use of hybrid tactics, and achieving 
their goal of annexation within minimal international response. The long-term 
consequences of Germany’s action are known, but what will happen to Russia remains to 
be seen and will provide further examples of differences between the two conflicts.  
K. CONCLUSION 
Christian Nunlist and Martin Zapfre describe hybrid war in the European context 
as “a long-known, politicized form of warfare below the threshold of full-blown 
conventional war that combines subversion and low-key political violence with external 
military pressure.”121 This is exactly what happened to Austria from 1933 to 1938.  
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Though Hitler was happy annexation was achieved, it was not quite what the 
Austrians thought it would be. After Austria was annexed, Germany quickly moved to 
neutralize any opposition in the country. Within a few days, 76,000 people were arrested 
in Vienna alone. The Austrian Nazi party, which had worked so hard to gain power, was 
abolished.  
Hitler’s success with the Anschluss is due to Germany’s successful use of hybrid 
tactics. Hitler also had the patience to wait for the proper moment. As the Nazis had 
thoroughly penetrated the Austrian society and government, Hitler knew he had time to 
focus on re-arming Germany and consolidating his power within the Reich, instead of 
worrying constantly about the Anschluss.  
However, the timing of the actual Anschluss was forced on Hitler by 
Schuschnigg’s surprise plebiscite. Despite the surprise, Hitler was able to take advantage 
of the situation, in no small part because of Germany’s greater military, economic, and 
political might. With the combination of hybrid tactics and the support of the local 
population, Hitler was able to achieve his goal without a shot being fired.  
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IV. THE 2008 RUSSIA-GEORGIA WAR 
 “Russia has historically been a guarantor for the security of the peoples 
of the Caucasus, and this remains true today.” 
—Dmitry Medvedev,  
President of Russia, Statement on the Situation in South Ossetia,  
August 8, 2008 
 
In August 2008, war erupted between Georgia and the Russian Federation. A 
cease-fire was signed after five days of fighting, but before it was signed, Russia 
destroyed the majority of the Georgian military and occupied several sections of the 
country. This chapter will examine Russia’s use of hybrid tactics leading up and during 
this conflict. This will be done by first, briefly examining the political history of Russia 
and Georgia. Second, discussing the events immediately preceding the start of the war. 
Third, the question of why Russia was successful will be answered, and some lessons 
learned about hybrid war will be examined. Finally, the conflict will be used to explore 
the broader geo-political context of Russia’s relations with other countries, specifically 
Ukraine. While a definition of hybrid war is using all mechanisms available without 
automatically resorting to military force, this conflict is different in that Russia starting 
planning a war with Georgia in 1999. Russia wanted to go to war, and had Georgia’s 
forces not starting fighting on the evening of August 7, 2008, another “pretext would 
have been found to proceed with the campaign as it had been planned.”122 From 1999 to 
2008, Russia subjected Georgia consistently to a political, psychological, military and 
economic “siege” using various hybrid tactics.123 The goal of the siege was to ensure 
Georgia stayed in Russia’s sphere of influence. Though Georgia had aspirations to join 
NATO and the EU, the August War of 2008 severely mired these ambitions, allowing 
Russia to secure the influence it worked so hard to obtain.  
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A. RUSSIAN AND GEORGIAN POLITICAL CONTEXT 
Georgia is located at the crossroads of Eastern Europe and Western Asia. As such, 
it was frequently under the control of various empires depending on the era. In 1801, the 
area of Georgia was annexed by Russia. It was a part of Russia from that time until the 
start of the 1917 Russian Revolution. For three years following the Revolution, the 
Democratic Republic of Georgia existed. It was invaded by Russian Red armies in 1921 
and became a Soviet republic shortly thereafter.  
As a Soviet republic, Georgia had three autonomous territories: Abkhazia, Adjara, 
and South Ossetia. Adjara was predominantly Muslim, but shared a common language 
and cultural heritage with Georgia. South Ossetians have a different language and are 
ethnically distinct from Georgians. Despite these differences, the two groups have lived 
together peacefully for years. During the Soviet era, Ossetians developed a "greater 
fraternity" with the Russians and were awarded status as an Autonomous Republic inside 
of the Russia and an Autonomous District inside of Georgia.124 
Abkhazia is yet another distinct ethnic group within the territory of Georgia. In 
1931, Joseph Stalin made Abkhazia an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, allowing 
it to rule itself without interference from Georgian authorities. The Abkhaz viewed the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union with concern, believing an independent Georgia would 
not allow Abkhazia to continue to have its autonomy.  
In 1991, Georgia was the first Soviet Republic to leave the Soviet Union. Ethnic 
strife between the Abkhaz, South Ossetians, and Georgians became more frequent, and 
war erupted between the Abkhaz and Georgians in 1992, lasting about a year. Georgia 
fought to keep Abkhazia incorporated in Georgia, and the Abkhaz fought for 
independence from Georgia. “It became clear,” wrote Thomas Goltz, “that Georgia was 
also fighting against shadowy elements of the Russian military who supplied the motley 
Abkhaz forces with weapons, logistics, and even aviation.”125 Georgia ended up losing 
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the conflict. Georgia lost complete control of Abkhazia, which “resulted in the near total 
collapse of Georgian statehood.”126 This marked the beginning of continued Russian 
interest and interference within Georgia after the fall of the Soviet Union.  
Russia, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, “never, even in the worst 
times, abandoned the idea of maintaining a special influence outside its borders.”127 This 
was especially true in Georgia. Russia sought to undermine Georgia’s drive for 
independence by supporting the separatist movements in both South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia.128  
Conflict between the two countries was exacerbated after Vladimir Putin was 
appointed prime minister in August 1999. On November 9, 2000, Russia started requiring 
visas for all Georgian citizens who wished to enter Russia. Georgia was the only country 
within the Commonwealth of Independent States required to do so. Visas were still 
required for the citizens of Abkhazia, Adjara, and South Ossetia, but the process was 
much easier for them than for the rest of Georgia.129 This diplomatic requirement was a 
hybrid tactic of increasing pressure on the Georgian government. Andrei Illarionov 
argued that this example (among others) demonstrated “Russian leadership’s inclination 
to use pressure, coercion and even violence in its bilateral relations with Georgia.”130 
Illarionov also argued Russia started planning for war with Georgia at this point (1999), 
almost a decade before it actually happened in 2008.131 
Eduard Shevardnadze, the last Soviet Foreign Minister, was elected as Georgia’s 
president in 1995 and was deeply unpopular in Russia. Shevardnadze, despite Russia’s 
displeasure and massive corruption problems, never gave up on the idea of Georgian 
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independence. During his tenure as president, Russia gradually increased pressure on 
Shevardnadze’s government. In 2002, Russia intentionally violated Georgia’s borders 
while bombing Chechnya and threatened to invoke Article 51 of the UN charter because 
Georgia was “harboring terrorists.”132 Russia also started widely distributing Russian 
passports to the residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which was illegal.133 On 
November 22, 2002, Shevardnadze responded to Russia’s actions by announcing 
Georgia’s intentions to join NATO.134 It came at a high price. Shevardnadze survived 
two assassination attempts, and “[Georgian] society was wrecked by two mutinies and 
countless plots to destabilize the government.”135 Russia’s use of hybrid tactics of threat 
of military force, diplomatic threat, and diplomatic action in these actions was clear.  
In 2003, following what is now called the Rose Revolution, Mikheil Saakashvili 
was elected as Georgia’s president. A key policy goal of Saakashvili was to “once and for 
all, pull [Georgia] out of Moscow’s sphere of influence, which [he] felt was holding 
Georgia back.”136 He also wanted to stamp out corruption and revitalize the economy. In 
other words, Saakashvili wanted to “go West,” and also openly talked about eventually 
joining NATO and even the EU.137 He also wanted to reincorporate Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia back into Georgia, a view strongly opposed by Russia. Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia make up about 20 percent of Georgia’s land area.  
Saakashvili’s actions put Georgia and Russia on the road to even more conflict. 
Vladimir Putin, elected Russia’s president in 2001, viewed Georgia’s actions as a threat 
to Russia’s interests. Ronald Asmus wrote, “the prospect of liberal democracy and a pro-
Western government taking root in the Southern Caucasus was seen as a challenge to 
Putin’s new narrative of rebuilding the Russia state through ‘sovereign democracy’ and to 
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it power and influence in its former neighborhood.”138 Russia’s responded by threatening 
Georgia and putting even more economic and political pressure on Georgia to change its 
ways.  
Georgia stayed its course. In the fall of 2006, four Russian intelligence officers 
were arrested in Georgia and charged with espionage. Moscow was outraged, and 
“responded by imposing a full economic embargo, banning trade as well as all transport 
and postal links.”139 The Russian government endorsed the harassment of Georgians 
(deporting many of them) and Georgian-owned businesses in Russia. Russia also worked 
to solidify their control of the separatist leadership in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, 
putting former Russian intelligence officers into key ministry positions in both 
provinces.140 Increasing economic pressure and ensuring there is adequate local support 
are important tactics of hybrid war.  
B. THE EVENTS BUILDING UP TO AND START OF WAR 
Marcel H. Van Herpen described the Russian-Georgian conflict in three phases: 
first, the “cold war” from December 2000 to spring 2008, the “lukewarm” war between 
spring 2008 to August 7, 2008, and the “hot war” from August 7 to August 12, 2008.141 
There were several hybrid provocations during the “lukewarm” phase of the conflict, 
including examples of diplomatic pressure, military provocation, and propaganda. On 
April 16, 2008, Putin signed a decree granting the two provinces diplomatic and legal ties 
with Russia.142 This new relationship “was virtually identical to that which existed 
between Moscow and the federal territories within Russian proper.”143 On April 20, 
2008, a Georgian drone was shot down over Abkhazia by a Russian MiG-29. Russia 
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categorically denied it was a Russian jet, but a UN report, published a month later proved 
otherwise.144 
In mid-May, Russian media started broadcasting stories that a war in Abkhazia 
was imminent and that the Georgians were planning to attack the province. The method 
of attack mentioned in the stories, however was not militarily very feasible.145 On May 
31, Moscow deployed 400 railroad troops to “rehabilitate the region’s railway and road 
infrastructure” for “humanitarian reasons.”146 In reality, these illegally deployed troops 
repaired only the sole railway connection between Russia and Sukhumi, the capital of 
Abkhazia. Russia usually deployed its army in great number by rail, and conveniently, 
the repairs were finished at the end of July, days before the war started.147 
On July 15, Russia began “Kavkaz-2008,” a large-scale military exercise in the 
region with the goal of performing an “operation of peace enforcement.”148 Participants 
of the exercise were given a “know your enemy” booklet with up-to-date information on 
Georgian forces.149 When the exercise ended on August 2, the troops did not leave the 
area. Around the same timeframe, South Ossetia began quietly evacuating women and 
children from Tskhinvali, the province capital.150 While the non-combatants were leaving 
Tskhinvali, Russia began flying into the city members of the Russian media, whose 
numbers reach 50 by August 7.151 
The tension became too much. On August 7, 2008, despite being cautioned by 
Western leaders to do otherwise, Saakashvili issued an order to the Georgian military to 
open fire on enemy positions in South Ossetia. Saakashvili goals in issuing the order 
were: “to defend Georgian villages, to preempt what he feared was a larger Russian 
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move, and to hopefully buy some time—time to evacuate Georgians at risk in South 
Ossetia and time for the world to respond.”152 The Georgian army was tasked to do the 
impossible: fight a battle it had not trained or prepared for.153 The army, predictably, 
failed in its efforts.  
From August 7 to August 12, Russia deployed 40,000 troops to Georgia, a 
number three times the total size of Georgia’s army.154 The Russian army quickly 
defeated the Georgian army and occupied over half of the country before a ceasefire was 
agreed upon and the war ended on August 11. The ceasefire was brokered by the 
European Union, led at that time by France. The agreement heavily favored Russia and 
Georgia’s aspirations to join NATO were destroyed.  
C. ASSESSING RUSSIAN SUCCESSES AND FAILURES IN GEORGIA 
Pavel Felgenhauer stated Russia’s main goal of the invasion “was to bring about 
state failure and fully destroy the Georgian army and centralized police force. A failed 
Georgian state, torn apart by political rivalry and regional warlords, cannot ever become 
a NATO member and could be easier to control from Moscow.”155 Russia was successful 
in neutralizing the army, but was not successful in completely destroying the state. 
Georgia’s government still existed, though its ability to protect its citizens was 
neutralized. Russia also wanted Saakashvili removed from office, but France in their 
cease-fire negotiations was able to prevent this from happening.156  
Russia thwarted Georgia from being able to seriously consider joining NATO. 
NATO will not grant countries membership if they have unsolved territorial disputes. 
Russia’s actions guaranteed Georgia will not ever be ever able to seriously resolve the 
territorial disputes within its borders. Now, seven and half years later, Georgia is no 
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closer to its NATO aspirations, and Russia still has defacto control of 20 percent of 
Georgia’s territory.  
Though Russia winning the 2008 war with Georgia seemed to be a forgone 
conclusion, Russia still made mistakes. This conflict was the first time Russia had, since 
the fall of the Soviet Union, used its military against an independent state. The doctrine 
and training employed by the Russian army was created during the Soviet era. The status 
of the Russia’s military was not great. Pavel Luzin stated “the war with Georgia in 2008 
demonstrated that the army, regardless of its numbers and weaponry, was very badly 
organized and not well-prepared for modern warfare.”157 Russia had very few casualties, 
but realized events could have gone a lot more smoothly. Following this conflict, Russia 
prioritized the modernization of its military. The fruit of this modernization was seen in 
how smoothly Russia annexed Crimea in 2014.  
D. LESSONS LEARNED ABOUT THE APPLICATION OF HYBRID WAR 
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Georgia was under a Russian political, 
psychological, military, and economic siege. Georgia wanted its independence, and 
Russia was equally determined to keep Georgia under its control. There are many 
examples of Russia’s use of hybrid tactics leading up to the 2008 war, but certain 
diplomatic, propaganda, and cyber tactics are worth examining further.  
1. Diplomatic 
In the spring of 2008, when conflict between Russia and Georgia seemed more 
and more likely, Washington and Berlin made new diplomatic efforts to improve the 
Russian-Georgian relationship. The efforts failed, but at the time, there was a belief they 
could succeed. Russia encouraged this belief. Asmus noted that “a time-honored tactic of 
military strategists…is to use diplomatic talks and negotiations as a cover to create the 
impression of negotiating while actually using the time to make final preparation for a 
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military assault.”158 In spring 2008, it was already too late for a serious diplomatic effort 
to succeed. Moscow had made the decision to go war, and nothing would deter Russia 
from its course. Russia allowed diplomatic negotiation to continue because it benefited 
Russia as a hybrid tactic.  
2. Propaganda 
Propaganda is an important tool in any conflict, hybrid or otherwise. When the 
war started, both Russian and Georgian media immediately started publishing their 
versions of events. Both views were extremely one sided. Russia was, however, able to 
get its narrative more widely published. This resulted in two notable events. The first 
dealt with how the how the ceasefire would be drafted. Nicolas Sarkozy, France’s 
president, was enlisted by the European Union to mitigate the ceasefire between Russia 
and Georgia. Sarkozy understood the importance of stopping the fighting as soon as 
possible. Asmus stated, however, “there is…little doubt that France’s thinking and 
diplomacy during the crisis were shaped, if only [in]directly, by a sense that Georgia had 
been in the wrong.”159 Prior to the war starting, France did not much care about Georgia. 
One French Foreign Ministry official stated “Georgia is not, has never been, and will 
never be a French national priority.”160 Through propaganda, Russia was able to 
capitalize on France’s lack of knowledge, even if it only meant putting a seed of doubt in 
Sarkozy’s mind regarding Georgia’s claims that Russia was at fault. The ceasefire did 
stop the fighting and allowed Saakashvili to stay in power, but it also allowed for a 
permanent Russian military presence on Georgian soil, something Georgia did not want. 
The second event was related to the effects of Russian propaganda on the local 
population. Russia’s narrative of the war is that on August 7, 2008, Georgian troops 
launched a surprise attack on South Ossetia. During the attack, Georgian troops allegedly 
committed genocide by killing 2,000 civilians, many of whom were Russian citizens. To 
stop this genocide, Russian troops staged a “humanitarian intervention” to save the lives 
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of its citizens living in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.161 Though there are many facts 
which prove Russia had been planning for the fight for a long time, this version of events 
was widely accepted in the local area. Charles King stated “the military operation that the 
West denounced as an act of aggression was seen in Russia and beyond as laudable, 
proportionate, and humanitarian.”162 Russia was successful in its hybrid use of 
propaganda during this conflict. 
3. Cyber 
This conflict differs from the 1923 Communist Revolution in Germany and the 
Anschluss in that it was the first time a country attacked another using cyber methods. 
Hackers were employed on both sides of the conflict, but Russia was able to use cyber 
means more effectively. On August 8, Georgia suffered a major Denial of Service Attack, 
which disrupted government and news websites.163 Banking and financial websites were 
also targeted. The goal of the attacks was to humiliate the Georgian government, and to 
“reduce the capability of the government to get its message out and to communicate to 
the outside world.”164 The cyber-attacks were massive and very sophisticated. The timing 
of these attacks coupled with the Russian air, ground, and sea attacks indicate that they 
were part of Russia’s larger political and military goals.165 The success of these cyber-
attacks suggests they will be included in future hybrid conflicts.  
4. Leadership 
Finally, it is unlikely that Georgia and Russia would have gone to war had 
Vladimir Putin not become Russia’s leader. A clash became inevitable when Putin 
decided Russia would no longer look towards the West, and sought to consolidate control 
over what Russia considered to be its sphere of influence. As Putin has been in charge of 
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Russia since 1999, he has had a great deal of time to come up with a strategy on 
maintaining Russia’s sphere of influence.   
E. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO RUSSIA’S ACTIONS 
The West strongly condemned Russia’s invasion of Georgia. This condemnation 
constituted the Western response, before, during, and after the conflict. Though 
Saakashvili and other Georgian leaders had been sounding an alarm that Russia was 
preparing for action, most Western leaders believed Georgia was crying wolf. The 
ceasefire agreement mediated by France’s president did stop the fighting, but did nothing 
to restore Georgia’s territorial integrity.166 Despite the promises made by NATO and EU 
leaders that Georgia would be welcomed into their organizations with open arms, in this 
crisis Georgia was alone.  
F. BROADER GEO-POLITICAL CONTEXT—WHY CHOOSE HYBRID 
STRATEGY  
One of the main reasons that war erupted between Russia and Georgia relates to a 
fundamental difference in how Russia and the West view the international security 
arrangement. Better understanding these views helps one to understand why Russia 
employed hybrid tactics against Georgia to secure Russia’s sphere of influence. One of 
the best examples which show the difference of opinion between Russia and the West is 
Kosovo.  
In 1999, NATO decided to use a military intervention to stop genocide in Kosovo. 
NATO embarked on this intervention without the support of a UN Security Council 
Resolution. NATO’s actions deeply troubled Russia, who felt “the United States was 
once again acting as if it had the right to impose its will on the world--throwing its weight 
around in the UN Security Council, enlisting NATO, and pushing the Organization for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) to do its bidding.”167 In other words, 
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Russia felt NATO’s actions in Kosovo were yet another example of American expansion 
under the guise of a humanitarian intervention.168    
Notwithstanding NATO’s claims it was acting to stop bloodshed, “few Russians 
could believe…NATO would become involved in a place as strategically unimportant as 
Kosovo unless it was part of some larger master plan.”169 Many Russians felt NATO’s 
actions in Kosovo were preparation for a future war with Russia in which the West would 
invade Chechnya for “humanitarian reasons.”170 The rationale behind this belief was in 
the many perceived similarities between Chechnya and Kosovo. Ultimately, the major 
concern was “if Moscow accepted intervention in Kosovo, sooner or later the same model 
would be applied to Russia.”171 Any form of NATO’s desire to expand its membership to 
European countries, especially in the eastern bloc, exacerbated Moscow’s concerns.  
Russia protested NATO’s actions in 1999, but could do little else. On February 
17, 2008, despite Russia’s strong objections, declared its independence. Kosovo’s new 
status was recognized by all Western nations, which confirmed to Russia that 
“Washington saw the Balkans as a sphere of influence where it could do what it 
wanted.”172 While Russia in 1999 could do little to respond to Western action in Kosovo, 
Russia in 2008 was in a completely different situation. For the previous nine years, Putin 
had been in charge of Russia, and under his leadership, Russia grew more anti-Western, 
autocratic, nationalist, and was more assertive in its dealings with the West. The West 
had made a move in the world’s security arena, and Russia had to respond. 
Georgia was Russia’s answer to “Western aggression.” Five days after Kosovo 
declared independence, Putin and Saakashvili had a meeting in Moscow. The following is 
from Georgia’s record of the meeting:  
(Putin to Saakashvili): There is an urgent need to react to what has 
happened in Europe on Kosovo. We are currently thinking how to deal 
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with the problem. You shall remember that we are under huge pressure 
from the republics of the Northern Caucasus, and we have to answer to 
their solidarity for Abkhazia and South Ossetia. We do not understand 
why the Americans have started their campaign of Islamicizing Europe. 
After the Albanians have swallowed Kosovo, they will try to expand 
further at the expense of Macedonia. 
You know we have to answer the West on Kosovo. And we are very sorry 
but you are going to be part of that answer.173 
In the end, Putin was not very sorry at all, and Russia’s answer came quickly. Within a 
month Russia adopted a special resolution endorsing Abkhazia and South Ossetias’ 
requests for independence.  
Despite these differences of opinion on how the world order should be, Russia 
knew it had to act carefully around NATO and the EU, lest they be provoked by Russian 
actions. Hybrid tactics provided Russia with the opportunity to increase pressure on 
Georgia while still leaving room for deniability of actions. If one hybrid tactic received 
too much attention, then Russia switched to another. The switching of tactics also 
confused the West, which was never sure which direction Russia was heading. This was 
intentional, Russia wanted to keep the West off-balance. With regards to Georgia, Russia 
was successful in masking its intentions to the West. Russia had been applying pressure 
on Georgia using hybrid tactics for years, even before Kosovo declared its independence. 
By the time the West realized what Russia was up to, it was too late for Georgia.  
G. CONCLUSION - IMPLICATIONS FOR RUSSIA AND UKRAINE TODAY 
The Georgian and 2014 Ukrainian conflicts are similar. Russia’s actions in 
Georgia can be described as an exercise of securing one’s sphere of influence. Georgia 
wanted more independence, and felt it could gain that independence by applying to 
NATO and adopt Western ideals of government. Russia was threatened by Georgia’s 
actions, and over time used hybrid tactics (and eventually war) to successfully neutralize 
Georgia’s Western aspirations.   
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If keeping Georgia in its sphere of influence was important to Russia, keeping 
Ukraine under its control was even more so. Like with Georgia, Russia has subjected 
Ukraine consistently to a political, psychological, military and economic “siege” using 
various hybrid tactics. The Ukrainian people’s rejection and disposal of its pro-Russian 
president in 2014 threatened Russia. To ensure Russia was able to maintain some form of 
control in Ukraine, Russia annexed the Crimea and invaded Eastern Ukraine. Though 
Russia’s actions have united many Ukrainians against it, Russian control of Donetsk and 
Lugansk ensures Russia will always have a voice in Ukraine. Russia’s recent actions in 
Ukraine, like those performed against Georgia, have secured Russia influence in Ukraine. 
The next case study will explain how.  
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V. THE 2014 RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN CONFLICT  
“In people’s hearts and minds, Crimea has always been an inseparable 
part of Russia. This firm conviction is based on truth and justice and was 
passed from generation to generation, over time, under any 
circumstances, despite all the dramatic changes our country went through 
during the entire 20th century.” 
“It is also obvious that there is no legitimate executive authority in Ukraine 
now.” 
—Vladimir Putin, 
 address by President of the Russian Federation, 
March 18, 2014 
 
This chapter will discuss the political background of Russia and Ukraine, 
followed by the events that led up to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in spring 2014. After 
exploring why the annexation was successful, some lessons learned about the hybrid 
conflict will be examined. Finally, the broader geo-political context of this case study 
will be explored. More specifically, Russia used hybrid war in Ukraine to further its 
foreign policy by trying to maintain its sphere of influence. The conclusion demonstrates 
that Russia is capitalizing on the West’s indecision to further Russia’s foreign policy 
wherever it can. Though taking advantage of a situation is common in international 
affairs, Putin is an opportunist who makes decisions in the near term but does not seem to 
be thinking long term. This does not bode well for Russia’s future.   
A. RUSSIAN AND UKRAINIAN POLITICAL BACKGROUND 
Russia and Ukraine have a unique relationship, with a shared historical and 
cultural heritage that goes back hundreds of years. Despite the shared history, conflict 
between the two countries was common after the fall of the Soviet Union. In 1954, Nikita 
Khrushchev “gave” Crimea to Ukraine. Crimea’s status as being a part of Ukraine was 
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confirmed by Russia in a treaty signed in 1990, before the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union.174  
The 1990s were difficult for both Ukraine and Russia and they struggled to 
transition from communism to capitalism and democracy. Russia lost the “superpower” 
label when the Soviet Union fell. Though Russia worked towards establishing a 
democratic form of government, it still sought to return to the same balance of power 
evident during the Cold War. President Boris Yeltsin stated in February, 1993, “The 
moment has come when responsible international organizations, including the United 
Nations, should grant Russia special powers as a guarantor of peace and stability in the 
region of the former Union.”175 Russia considered its sphere of influence to be very 
important, and took steps to ensure it could wield that influence in the former Eastern 
Bloc. Russia was not always successful doing so during the transitional period of the 
1990s.  
After Putin came to power in 2001, he went out securing his power and 
strengthening the Russia state. One of his main goals was for Russia to maintain the same 
sphere of influence over Eastern Europe that the Soviet Union enjoyed while it was in 
power. Maintaining this sphere of influence required Russia to resist any form of what it 
perceived to be as Westward expansion. Therefore, processes of democratization, 
liberalization and integration with Western institutions in its sphere of influence are 
contrary to Russian interests.176  
Ukraine handled the transition from communism to democracy poorly. Corruption 
was blatant, and most of the state institutions maintained the same ineffective 
organization that existed during the Soviet regime. After its independence, Ukraine had 
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the second most powerful military in Europe (after Russia).177 Poor management, lack of 
upkeep, and corruption caused the degradation of Ukraine’s military to the point that by 
2014, “it hardly qualifi[ed] as cohesive armed forces.”178 
Starting in 2002, Ukraine found itself stuck in the middle of a “severe geopolitical 
competition” between the EU and Russia, Europe’s two main spheres of influence.179 
The Orange Revolution in 2004 brought a more pro-Western government to power, an 
event Moscow viewed with alarm. Moscow was relieved when Victor Yanukovych, who 
was considered pro-Russian, was elected as Ukraine’s president in 2010.  
Russia’s Ukrainian policy developed in three stages as Ukraine sallied back and 
forth between the EU and Russia for support and integration. These stages include “mild 
persuasion to integrate into Eurasian formations under the auspices of Russia, forcing 
Ukraine to do so (using political and diplomatic, economic, energy sector, and 
information leverages), and finally, -direct military aggression.”180 The second stage with 
its diverse use of hybrid tactics is of most interest to this case study.  
B. EVENTS LEADING TO ANNEXATION OF CRIMEA AND WAR IN THE 
DONBAS 
Ukraine at the end of 2013 and beginning of 2014 went through a great deal of 
political turmoil. Fighting broke out in Kiev during this time between protesters and the 
Pro-Russian President Yanukovych. One of the main reasons for fighting was that 
Yanukovych declined to sign a trade agreement with the EU in November of 2013. In 
December of that year, Yanukovych signed an agreement with Russian President 
Vladimir Putin in which Russia promised to buy $15 billion dollars of Ukrainian debt and 
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lower the cost of Russian gas sold to Ukraine by one third.181 Yanukovych’s new 
arrangement with Russia was very unpopular with many Ukrainian citizens. This new 
agreement increased turmoil, and fighting in Ukraine continued in January and February 
of 2014. On February 22, President Yanukovych disappeared from Kiev, a day after 
signing a compromise deal with Ukrainian opposition leaders. 
During this time, Russia conducted a large series of snap military exercises all 
along the Russia-Ukrainian Border. An International Institute for Strategic Studies report 
noted: “Russian troops were rapidly mobilized in significant numbers to carry out 
exercises close to the Ukrainian border. The forces’ stance repeatedly changed as 
Moscow sought to vary the pressure on Ukraine and the West.”182 Russia sought to 
distract new Ukrainian government and the West by using these exercises. As it was 
doing so, Russia started quietly deploying troops to Crimea. Though Ukraine knew 
Russia was up to something in Crimea, the threat of a military invasion caused Ukraine to 
pause and ultimately do nothing while Russia solidified control in Crimea. Russia used 
these military exercises as a hybrid means of distraction and a way of destabilizing the 
situation in Ukraine.183 By the end of February, armed men had taken over several 
government building in Crimean cities and uniformed soldiers without any rank or 
country insignia were seen around the Crimean peninsula.  
After Yanukovych was ousted in February of 2014, Russian gas companies began 
threatening to shut off gas to Ukraine, a hybrid economic technique. This is partly 
because Ukraine was late in its payments to Russia; however, Russia owns many of the 
gas companies which provide services to Ukraine and much of Europe. It is interesting 
that Russian gas companies raise prices and threaten to shut off gas when relations 
between Ukraine and Russia are not the greatest. 
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From the end of February through mid-March, Russia effectively used special 
forces and Crimean-based Russian naval infantry to surround and eventually take over all 
Ukrainian military bases and ships in Crimea. It was important to Russia to ensure this 
was done with the least amount of force possible. Few shots were actually fired and 
deaths were minimal. Russian forces were used to intimidate the Ukrainian military into 
surrendering. Russia capitalized on the new Ukrainian government’s indecision to react 
to the presence of unidentified soldiers in Crimea. A questionable referendum was held 
by Crimean citizens who voted for independence from Ukraine and on March 18, Putin 
signed a bill to absorb Crimea into the Russia Federation.  
Further unrest in Eastern Ukraine followed these events. Protestors against the 
new Ukrainian government occupied government buildings in Donetsk, Lugansk, Odessa, 
and Kharkov. Donetsk and Lugansk are in a region of Ukraine known as the Donbas. 
These regional protestors were pro-Russian and many started calling for local 
referendums following Crimea’s example in declaring independence from Ukraine. On 
May 11, pro-Russian separatists in the oblasts184 of Donetsk and Lugansk declared 
independence after internationally unrecognized referendums. Fighting between the 
separatists and Ukrainian government forces began and became more frequent. Russia 
started providing supplies to the separatists, often without consent of the Ukrainian 
government.  
More information emerged that Russia was not just providing humanitarian 
supplies, but also tanks, military supplies, jamming equipment, surface to air missiles, 
medical supplies and “volunteers.”185 Accounts differs as to the origin of these 
volunteers. NATO and EU suspect that these people are not only volunteers, but that a 
significant portion are Russian soldiers who were “voluntold” to go to Ukraine and help 
the separatists.186 Russia’s continued denial of any Russian troops in Eastern Ukraine, 
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and trying to “hide” the nationality of these troops is another example of Russian hybrid 
tactics.   
Russia, using another hybrid tactic, also launched a massive propaganda 
campaign in both the Donbas and Crimea during the first three tumultuous months of 
2014. An example in Ukraine was Russia’s use of multimedia portraying Ukraine as the 
“victim of a fascist coup, taken over by a Western puppet regime.”187 One of the Russian 
aims was “to sustain the pretense that the fighting force was wholly indigenous, 
supplemented by no more than some friendly volunteers from over the border.”188 
Ukraine, and especially Crimea, was depicted as an essential part of the Russian 
world.189 Before the Crimean referendum, advertising popped up everywhere around the 
peninsula encouraging the Crimean citizens to vote for reunification with Russia. On one 
billboard, two maps of Crimea are shown; one with a Nazi symbol and the other with the 
Russian flag. The advertisement stated “On 16 March we choose Nazism or joining with 
Russia.”190 There were no other options, and the implication was that by not joining 
Russia, Crimea would be under Fascist control. This was not true, but was a good 
example of Russian propaganda used to create discord in Ukraine.  
C. ASSESSING RUSSIAN SUCCESSES AND FAILURES IN UKRAINE  
Russia’s maneuvers in Crimea were a brilliant mix of hybrid tactics which 
allowed Russia to annex the peninsula. This was possible because of several reasons. 
First, Russia had thoroughly penetrated Ukraine’s government and military. This access 
of information provided Russia with flexibility in determining how it would respond to 
Ukrainian government action. Second, Russia was a stronger country economically and 
militarily to begin with. Russia used both its economy and military to threaten Ukraine if 
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Ukraine did not do what Russia wanted. Put bluntly, Ukraine needed Russia’s money and 
gas more than Russia needed Ukraine. This relationship made Ukraine more carefully 
consider all options before any action was made against Russian aggression. Third, 
Russia saw a window of opportunity open and was able to capitalize on the new 
Ukrainian government’s fragility and lack of information. When Ukraine finally realized 
Russia’s intentions in Crimea, it was too late for Ukraine to do much about it.   
Evaluating Russia’s success in the Donbas is not as clear as the Crimean 
annexation. Throughout the entire conflict, Russia has insisted that there are no Russian 
troops or military equipment in the Donbas, despite evidence saying otherwise.191 
Fighting has been long, and the conflict has gone from being hybrid to being more 
conventional. Adrian Karatnycky and Alexander J. Motyl argued "the Kremlin's war in 
Ukraine is turning into a quagmire."192 The conflict has turned into a military stalemate, 
an economic drain on Russia, and has unified the rest of Ukraine against Russia.193 Putin 
has backed himself into a corner by supporting the separatists. If Russia withdraws 
support now, the separatists would not be able to survive. It seems as though neither 
Ukraine nor Russia know what to do about the Donbas. Russia's ideal situation would be 
reincorporating the two provinces back into Ukraine and guaranteeing that Russia 
(behind the scenes) is in control of the future province leadership. Whether that will 
happen remains to be seen.  
D. LESSONS LEARNED ABOUT THE APPLICATION OF HYBRID WAR 
Russia’s specific military actions in Crimea have been discussed at length 
elsewhere and will not be further examined in this case study.194 They were a critical 
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component of the annexation, but they were not the sole component. Possession is nine 
tenths of the law, and Russian military forces in Crimea ensured Russia could keep the 
peninsula, but the other non-military methods were important to provide legitimacy for 
Russia’s actions. Although military actions in Crimea were a lynchpin of Russia’s 
strategy, Roy Allison identifies five Russia’s non-military actions that “work[ed] towards 
the political goal of restructuring the Ukrainian state.”195 The categories are diplomatic, 
legal, media campaigns, economic pressures and threats, and local support.  
1. Diplomatic  
Through Russia’s actions in Ukraine, Irina Kobrinskaya believed Russia is trying 
to maximize its international independence and increasing its status in the "global power 
balance." Another point she mentioned is Russia’s strengthening of its position “through 
coalition-building, which makes leading power turn to integrations projects with new 
zeal."196 The competition over the EU Eastern Partnership project and Russian Eurasian 
Council integration projects was a major reason the situation in Ukraine deteriorated at 
the end of 2013. Kobrinskaya believed the Ukraine crisis created problems for Russia's 
Eurasian integration. Russia's actions have unified much of Ukraine against Russia.197 
Оleg Grytsaienko agreed with this assessment and went on to say that he expected 
relations between Ukraine and Russia would not go beyond basic cooperation issues.198 
Belarus and Kazakhstan have watched Russia annex Crimea and worry about what the 
implications are for their own countries. Russia has noticed this, and is trying to build 
better relationships with Belarus, Kazakhstan, and other non-European countries.199  
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2. International Law Interpretations 
Russia challenged several law interpretations during its hybrid conflict with 
Ukraine. Allison commented: “Russia is a major power, with a permanent seat on the UN 
Security Council, which aspires to shape and constrain interpretations of law and 
international norms in the wider community of states as well as in its own 
neighborhood.”200 Some of the key law issues which have come up include Russian 
intervention to save ethnic Russian lives in foreign countries, continuing to deny it has 
military forces in Ukraine, and claiming Ukraine stopped being a state when its president 
lost power in February 2014.  
Russia claimed the lives and civil liberties of ethnic Russians in Ukraine were in 
peril.201 Russia passed a law which allows it to intervene in another country should 
ethnic Russians be threatened.202 Russia does not care if other countries do not recognize 
this law; it is enough that they have it to justify their own actions. Countries with big 
ethnic Russian population like Estonia, Latvia, and Moldova look at this law with 
concern. Allison continues: “Ultimately, Russian conduct in Ukraine since February 2014 
not only forms a challenge to states on its periphery; it also calls for efforts to avoid a 
dangerous escalation of tensions involving western powers, since core legal principles are 
contested, and alternative rules and understandings to manage the competitive tensions 
that remain in the post-Soviet region are far from agreed.”203 The possibility that Russia 
will use these new interpretations of international law in future foreign policy goals is 
strong. 
Another legal claim Russia made is the denial that its regular military forces were 
used in Ukraine. This allowed Russia to avoid being bound by the strict use of force 
definitions employed by the UN Charter. There have been several reports of Russian 
soldiers dying in Ukraine, but the Russian government has either refused to say where the 
soldiers died or claimed the soldiers were “volunteers” and not actually working for the 
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Russian government.204 Hybrid conflicts are, by definition, meant to confuse and Russia 
has used this to its advantage when responding to Western “outrage” of its actions.  
One of Russia’s main legal arguments was that Ukraine stopped being a state 
once its legitimate president (Yanukovych) was removed from power by a Western-
orchestrated coup. This action removed Ukraine’s status as a sovereign state, and thus, all 
previous Russian-Ukrainian treaties were now null and void. Russia included several 
treaties in this interpretation, including a 1997 status of force agreement and the 1994 
Budapest Memorandum (both agreements speak of the territorial integrity of Ukraine).205 
Therefore, Russia can act as it wants in Ukraine because Ukraine is no longer a state. 
This view is condemned in the West, but that has not stopped Russians from embracing 
the new interpretation.  
Differences of opinion in interpreting international law have two major 
implications. They have helped Russia succeed in its hybrid war conflict with Ukraine by 
keeping the West focused on how the law should be interpreted instead of actually doing 
something about the situation in Ukraine. Second, there are questions as to how Russia 
can use these legal interpretations in its foreign policy beyond the Ukrainian situation. 
Lavrov stated that Russia feels America used international law to impose its will across 
world.206 A Russian foreign policy goal is to increase Russia’s sphere of influence, 
therefore Russia will likely attempt to do the same thing when they feel the need to. Not 
accepting the Western interpretation of international law is another foreign policy goal of 
Russia. In Ukraine, Russia very carefully crafted the situation on the ground to justify its 
actions and say everything was done in accordance with Russian interpretation of law. 
Russia did not care that most Western leaders rejected its interpretation, and talked about 
double standard of how the West often “interpreted” a specific international law to its 
own benefit. If the West does, why cannot Russia do the same? 
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As Russian foreign policy is often directly tied with its domestic policy, Russia 
will use its legal claims in foreign policy to rally the masses domestically as well. Allison 
noted this happened in Ukraine when he stated “Russian legal claims have been 
constructed to mobilize and consolidate Russian domestic opinion around Putin’s 
leadership. They include justifications for the Russian use of force and the annexation of 
Crimea, blanketed in partial truth and disinformation, cast in terms which appeal to 
deeper sentiments and grievances in Russian society and among Russian elites.”207 
Russia opinion polls of its government actions in Ukraine suggest the government has 
been successful in this endeavor.  
3. Propaganda 
Russia has a massive propaganda machine. The machine not only spreads 
disinformation along Russia’s borders, but works to increase support domestically as 
well. Russia recently promised to greatly increase the funding of RT (Russia Today) as 
well increase the targeted audience.208 Putin has been in control of Russia for a long 
time. The length of time he has been in power ensured Russia’s foreign and domestic 
policy views are united in the face of the international community. The increase in 
funding of RT will encourage that this message is spread even wider.   
Using the idea of fascism also helped Russia to solidify its citizen’s support. 
However, continuing on a course of lies is dangerous to Russia. Lawrence Freedman 
noted “a government which insists on fictional descriptions of situations can get caught 
out, in what Jeffrey Michaels has identified as a ‘discourse trap’, whereby maintaining 
consistency with the fiction means that it must be upheld even when the result is to push 
counterproductive policies.”209 Whether Russia can maintain this facade in the future 
remains to be seen.  
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4. Use of Economy 
Since 1990, Russia has frequently used its gas and energy resources as an 
instrument of foreign policy, and Russia’s dealings with Ukraine are no exception. Russia 
has multiple times restricted the gas flow to Ukraine, increased gas prices, and threatened 
to shut off gas completely, depending on what was going on at the time. Indeed, Russia 
uses its gas as both a carrot and a stick. A carrot (in the form of discounts) when the 
country does what Russia wants it to, and a stick (by threatening to cut off gas or raising 
prices) when the country does not. Ukraine has felt both influences.  
5. Local Support 
Finally, Russia could not have succeeded in Crimea had it not had a great deal of 
local support. The support was not difficult to find. The majority of people living on the 
Crimean Peninsula are ethnically Russian, many of whom did not feel any loyalty to the 
Ukrainian government. The few people who were opposed to annexation were 
intimidated to keep their mouths closed by both pro-Russian supporters and the presence 
of armed (though unmarked) Russian military members.  
E. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO RUSSIA’S ACTIONS 
The West has scrambled to respond to Russia’s hybrid actions and has yet to 
come up with a unified strategy, but both military and non-military responses has been 
made. The success of these responses has yet to be determined, but the economic 
consequences on Russia are acknowledged.  The West’s actions have not been successful 
if the goal was stop Russian action in Ukraine. In light of Russia’s recent actions in Syria, 
the development of a unified Western response to events in Ukraine are even less likely.  
One of NATO’s first responses included increasing air sorties over Europe, 
temporarily deploying more troops to NATO countries located in Eastern Europe, and 
conducting military exercises. In short, NATO made its military presence known to 
assure its Eastern European members that it would support them in facing Russian 
aggression. In one recent example, American troops participated in a military parade in 
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Latvia 300 yards from the Russian border.210 Britain and the United States have declared 
they will send advisors to help train the Ukrainian military, but emphasized the advisors 
would not be involved in any combat operations. During the Wales Summit, the Very 
High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) was formed to quickly respond anywhere in 
Europe.  
The VJTF was described as being able “to deploy 4,000-6,000 troops within a two 
to five day notice, much faster than the existing NATO Response Force.”211  The VJTF 
is still only a concept, but shows NATO is concerned about Russia’s actions and is 
responding. Ultimately, NATO is a military alliance, but counteracting hybrid warfare 
will require more than just a military response. Russia knows that it cannot fight NATO 
in a traditional conventional battle, so it will continue to use hybrid tactics to keep NATO 
off balance. Doing so furthers Russia’s foreign policy goal of striving to maintain its 
areas of influence and balance of power in Eastern Europe.  
Whereas NATO has provided a military response, the EU has provided some non-
military responses. A recent U.S. congressional report on the Ukrainian crisis noted the 
United States and the EU have both have “provided additional financial aid to bolster 
Ukraine's political transition, condemned Russia's annexation of Crimea, called for 
Russia to end its support of separatists in eastern and southern Ukraine, and taken steps to 
isolate Russia diplomatically.”212 Though the U.S. and the EU have pursued similar 
policies, there has still been much debate on where and how much to respond to Russia’s 
hybrid actions.  
One of the EU’s major responses involves placing sanctions on several Russian 
businesses and individuals. The severity of these sanctions increased when it became 
clear the situation in Ukraine was worsening. Russia has denounced the sanctions placed 
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upon its citizens and businesses, and responded in kind by banning food imports from 
several European countries.  Russia has repeatedly claimed the sanctions are illegal, not 
hurting its economy, and continues to deny it is doing anything in Ukraine. 
However, sanctions are hurting Russia more than it lets on. Russia’s credit has 
been rated by the S&P as “junk.”213 Russia’s inflation is increasing, its unemployment is 
increasing, and its GDP has stopped growing.  The question has become how much 
Russia can accomplish in Ukraine before its economy collapses. Russia arguably could 
not afford annexing Crimea, and its actions so far suggest that it does not want to annex 
Donetsk or Lugansk, merely to encourage unrest. Russia would be happy to have the 
provinces remain in control of pro-Russian separatists who would represent Russian 
interests in the area  
In the context of the Western’s responses, Russia has been forced to reassess its 
foreign policy, particularly in response to energy. In January 2015, Russia scrapped its 
South Stream oil pipeline plan. Russia stated they did this to cut down reliance on the 
Ukrainian pipeline and because it makes more economic sense to do it this way. 
However, Stanley Reed and Sebnem Arsu from The New York Times argue that Russia is 
more than likely "accepting the current geopolitical realities."214 South Stream was 
originally planned to go through Bulgaria, Hungary, and Serbia. However, the EU had 
concerns about this plan, and what happened in Ukraine exacerbated the situation. The 
EU is trying to lessen its reliance on Russian gas and the EU successfully pressured 
Bulgaria to block the line until Russia agreed to the EU's energy competition rules. 
Rather than deal with Europe, Russia chose to go through Turkey instead. This was a 
large change from how Russia had originally planned to send gas to Europe.215 
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Russia is pursuing more economic cooperation with Pacific countries (specifically 
China) because of the European sanctions. Sergey Lavrov spoke of this when he said 
"Turning our country towards the Pacific is a national priority for the twenty-first 
century, and is directly linked to the dynamic development of Russia’s eastern regions. 
We would, of course, prefer to take this step in tandem with steps to strengthen our links 
with Europe, rather than instead of that. On this issue, however, we cannot but take into 
consideration the decisions adopted by our European partners.”216 It is doubtful Russia 
expected to change its oil pipeline plans when it started its hybrid war with Ukraine, but 
it is hard to plan for unintended consequences.  
F. BROADER GEO-POLITICAL CONTEXT—WHY CHOOSE HYBRID 
STRATEGY 
Michael Kofman and Matthew Rojansky stated “Russia’s intervention in Ukraine 
should be understood in more flexible and basic terms—as an attempt to employ 
diplomatic, economic, military, and information instruments in a neighboring state where 
it perceives vital national interests to be at stake.”217 One of the main reasons Russia 
chose to use hybrid tactics in Ukraine is resources. Russia knows that it cannot compete 
against the combined military and economic might of NATO and the EU. Therefore, 
Russia employs hybrid tactics in an attempt to keep the West off-balance as Russia tries 
to protect its national interests. The choice of hybrid tactics is evident in how Russia has 
used its foreign and domestic policy.  
Russia has used and furthered its foreign policy strategy through hybrid war. 
Russia wanted to ensure Ukraine would not fall under the influence of NATO or the EU, 
and was partially successful in achieving this goal. Ukraine joining NATO or the EU will 
not happen anytime soon. Russia’s influence in Donetsk and Lugansk guarantees Russia 
will have a voice at the table when or if Ukraine does take the necessary steps to join 
NATO or the EU. However, Russia’s actions have turned much of the Ukrainian 
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population against Russia. Russia succeeded in the short term, but it remains to be seen if 
Russia will succeed in keeping Ukraine isolated from Western influence in the long term.  
Hannes Adomeit argued that Russian foreign policy is used to garner domestic 
support for Russian actions. He also argued that Russia frames its policies in Eastern 
Europe as “an extension of domestic politics and, second, in response to challenges it 
perceives emanating from ‘the West’ in general.”218 In other words, developments in 
Eastern Europe are perceived to affect Russian domestic policy. The “color revolutions” 
which happened in Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine during the 2000s all started because of 
blatant election fraud. Ultimately, if these revolutions happened in Eastern Europe, they 
could also happen in Russia, and that concerned the Russian government, which made 
steps accordingly. Russia did not believe these revolutions came about by themselves. 
Adomeit stated “the ouster of three corrupt and authoritarian regimes in Europe was 
primarily not the result of spontaneous and indigenous mass demonstrations but the result 
of careful planning and organizational efforts undertaken by external western actors.”219  
G. CONCLUSION 
Scholars support the observation that Putin is an opportunist who does not have a 
long-term strategy for Russia. Freedman agreed, and said “Putin’s power play in Ukraine 
was impulsive and improvised, without any clear sense of the desired end state.”220 
Grytsaienko concurred with Freedman and believes Putin has no “grand strategy” in his 
foreign policy.  
Moscow may have a political idea, therefore – one that reflects continuity 
in broad purpose over a decade – and a push has clearly been made since 
2012 to create a unifying process of coordination. If there is an increasing 
sense of urgency to this process, however, there is no ‘grand strategy’. The 
array of problems – and the consequent persistent need for the top 
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leadership to perform manual control – mean that power is created only 
unevenly and adaptability is limited.221  
The lack of a national “grand strategy” is troublesome, especially when coming 
from a nuclear-armed country that does not seem to have any qualms in taking territory 
from another nation. It is understandable why the West has looked at Russia’s actions 
with alarm.  
That being said, Russia was able to achieve some its foreign policy goals through 
hybrid war. Russia’s actions in Ukraine, its efforts in creating the Eurasia Economic 
Council, and its friendship with Serbia demonstrate Russia is actively trying to preserve 
its spheres of influence in Eastern Europe. This foreign policy goal will not go away. 
Russia will continue to seek to maintain and increase its power in Eastern Europe and 
abroad.   
The final Russian goal to be discussed is Russia’s desire to be seen as a great 
power (like the Soviet Union earlier). It is doubtful they have been successful in 
achieving this goal. Russia’s economy is not doing well and more work remains before 
its military would be considered modernized by Western standards. President Barack 
Obama states “Russia is a regional power that is threatening some of its immediate 
neighbors — not out of strength but out of weakness.”222 However, within what it 
considers to be its sphere of influence, Russia is undoubtedly the strongest power. The 
ultimate question is not whether Russia will continue to use hybrid actions to maintain 
that power, but how long Russia will be able to maintain the façade behind the power. 
Only time will tell.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
This thesis argued that Russia has used and furthered its foreign policy strategy 
through hybrid war. Russia has declared it promotes international stability, but in reality 
it is seeking to improve the balance of power in its sphere of influence while at the same 
time using foreign policy to garner domestic support. Russia’s conflicts in Georgia and 
Ukraine were started because those two countries were interested in adopting a more 
Western style of government. This threatened Russia, which took steps to neutralize the 
possibility either country would be able to permanently “go West.”  
At the beginning of this thesis, several hypotheses about hybrid war were 
introduced. They will now be re-examined using Russia and the contents of the case 
studies to evaluate their significance. Local support, length of conflict, and power-
balance between states are interwoven in hybrid conflicts. Each concept will be 
discussed, with the understanding that they all tie back to each other in intricate ways.  
From the beginning, it has been argued that state-waged hybrid war is successful 
if the offensive state is able to secure the support of the people in the area where war is 
being waged. The proof of this hypothesis can be found in the successful Anschluss and 
the creation of two frozen conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine. A major factor in the Soviet 
Union’s communist revolution failure in 1923 was the lack of local German support. 
Local support can provide a form of legitimacy to the aggressor state, as well as a reason 
to intervene in the defender state.  
Cultural and ethnic similarities between the aggressor and defender state seem to 
make a difference, if only because it allowed both countries to understand each other 
better. It also contributes to the degree the intelligence services have penetrated the other 
country. Russia has probably been more successful in penetrating the Ukrainian 
government than in penetrating the Chinese government because of the shared culture 
and ethnic history. Russians and Georgians are not as culturally close as Russians and 
Ukrainians, but Georgia’s political entanglement with Russia has existed since the early 
1800s.  
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More recently, Russia used local support as a means of ensuring it would always 
have a voice in Georgia and Ukraine, but its actions have come at a cost. Russia was 
initially able to gain an operational advantage in both Georgia and Ukraine, but the long-
term impact of Russia’s actions on that local support is uncertain. Pavel Luzin argued 
“there is no doubt that Ukraine has left Moscow’s sphere of influence.”223 There is also a 
feeling of resentment against Russia in Georgia. The longer these conflicts go on, the 
greater the resentment in Georgia and Ukraine will grow.  
While the length of the conflict seems to favor the stronger state, it also can 
undermine the aggressor state’s ability to convert the hearts and minds of the local people 
to the aggressor state’s cause. The length of the conflict seemed to aid Nazi Germany’s 
influence in Austria and Russia’s influence in Georgia. The same cannot be said, 
however, for what is currently going on in Ukraine. Pavel Luzin argued that the length of 
the conflict actually hurts the aggressor more than it helps. He stated:  
“the longer [the war] lasts, the lesser the chance of victory for the 
aggressor. Russian history shows that the average life span for a proxy 
power is a few months to a half-year. What follows is either political 
corruption or the aggressor is no longer depended upon. If the government 
that launched a hybrid war does not shift the conflict into an official level 
and begin to operate openly, the political goals of the war are 
unattainable.”224  
By Luzin’s definition, Russia has lost its political goals in the Ukrainian conflict.  
Another argument introduced in this thesis is that success only goes to the state 
with the most resources and time, and what particular hybrid methods the state uses are 
not germane. The 2008 Russian-Georgian conflict provides a good example of how 
length of conflict is more important than the individual hybrid tactics used. Russia used 
hybrid tactics to pressure Georgia from 1999 to 2008, but those tactics were not enough 
to force Georgia to capitulate to Russian demands. During this time, Russia made war 
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plans to use should Georgia not give in. Georgia stayed its course, so Russia went to war 
and won because of its stronger economic and military resources.   
Nico Popescu stated: “One reason why hybrid war is so dangerous and potentially 
destabilising is that it is easy and cheap to launch for external aggressors, but costly in 
various ways for the defenders.”225 This is true. In all the case studies but the 1923 
Revolution attempt, the relative strength of the aggressor state allowed it to use hybrid 
tactics against the defender state without fear of reprisal. This was because the defender 
state needed the aggressor state more than the aggressor state needs the defender state. As 
such, the defender state is often forced to look the other way, and ignore the temptation to 
respond to the hybrid tactics because responding will make the situation worse. This 
happened when Georgia arrested four Russian spies in 2006, Russia responded with an 
economic embargo and government-sponsored action against Georgians living in Russia.  
In all of the case studies, the international response to the aggressor state’s actions 
was small and disjointed, which allowed the aggressor state to continue the hybrid 
conflict. The one exception is the recent 2014 Ukrainian conflict, where the U.S. and the 
EU answered Russia’s actions by placing sanctions. The sanctions have hurt Russia’s 
economy, but they have not been enough of a retort to get Russia to change its action in 
Ukraine. It is difficult to ascertain the effectiveness of the international response to an 
aggressor state’s action when there is a lack of consensus on what that response should 
be. Russia has taken advantage of the West’s fragmented response to continue to push its 
interests within its sphere of influence.  
There has been much debate on whether or not Russia had a grand strategy when 
it started its conflict in Ukraine. Andrei Kolsenikov wrote “the [Putin] regime has 
demonstrated no ability to think strategically—let alone to establish clear, achievable 
goals or to offer a model of what the future should look like.”226 Olga Oliker agreed and 
stated: “Predicting Russian behavior is hard because Russia does not have a strategy. 
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While it has strategic goals, it pursues them primarily by seeking opportunities, rather 
than developing clear plans.”227 Oliker makes a valid point. Russia took advantage of the 
new Ukrainian government’s impotence by seizing Crimea. Russia also saw an 
opportunity to act in the Donbas, but that experience has not been as successful and has 
left Russia in a quagmire. 
Despite the feeling many have that Putin lacks strategy, he should not be 
underestimated. Fiona Hill counter-argued:  
[Putin] thinks strategically, and has had great advantages over Western 
leaders in his ability to translate that thinking into action. What we often 
fail to appreciate, however, is how dangerously little Putin understands 
about us—our motives, our mentality, and also, our values. Only by trying 
to appreciate how Putin sees us can we see the logic in his actions—the 
logic he follows—and thereby gets some idea of what he wants, where he 
might be headed, in Ukraine and elsewhere in Europe and Eurasia.228  
Lack of understanding breeds more conflict. Until a greater effort is made to 
understand the motivations behind Putin’s decisions, conflict will inevitably continue.  
"Hybrid War" has been used in dozens of publications to describe Russia's actions 
in Crimea and the Donbas. Though the methods used by Russia were not new, the way in 
which they were applied has generated much discussion and concern at a strategic level. 
“The concern,” noted Nico Popescu, “is not so much about Russia’s tools and capabilities 
(be it tanks or TV channels), but about how their combined use can affect political and 
strategic realities within the EU and NATO."229 There is no question that Russia has 
affected these realities, and capitalized on the lack of coordinated Western response to 
push its agenda further.  
What then, should be the process going forward? The world needs to recognize 
when hybrid tactics are being used so that an appropriate response can be made. Using 
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the case studies in this thesis will help in this endeavor. What that response should be 
depends on the hybrid tactic. Instead of blindly reacting to the use of an aggressive hybrid 
tactic, leaders should take a step back and to try and determine what the aggressor state’s 
next step will be.  This is not easy, as an important aspect of hybrid war is deception. 
Examining historical hybrid incidents will also help, as the length of the conflict matters 
a great deal in hybrid war.  
Regarding Russia, putting more effort into diplomacy and better understanding 
the rationale and motivation behind Putin’s actions will also help. Russia has major 
concerns about Western expansion and interference in Eastern Europe. Oliker wrote: “A 
quick skim of Russian government statements going back to the Yeltsin years makes 
clear that if the United States had long ago written Russia off as a rival, the Kremlin 
continued to view Washington as consciously and intentionally working to weaken 
Moscow and its global influence.”230  NATO and the EU may be trying to expand, but it 
is not because they wish to check Russia’s power. Instead, the West wishes to spread 
democracy and ensure an individual’s rights are protected. Those desires, however, are an 
antithesis of what Putin has created in Russia. Putin consolidated his power by removing 
rights, not giving them. 
In the meantime, Russia will continue to use hybrid tactics to protect its sphere of 
influence, in the hopes that the world will return to the balance of power that existed of 
power that existed during the Cold War. How successful Russia will be in this endeavor 
remains to be seen.  
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